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McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n
12-536
Ruling Below: McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 893 F.Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012), cert.
granted, 133 S.Ct. 1242.
Prospective campaign contributor, political party's national committee, and nonparty political
committee brought action challenging constitutionality of Federal Elections Campaign Act's
(FECA) aggregate limit on candidate contributions and other contributions to party committees.
Federal Election Commission filed motion to dismiss. A three-judge panel of the District Court
held that FECA's aggregate limit on candidate contributions and other contributions to party
committees were a permissible means under First Amendment of preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption, and were not unconstitutionally overbroad.
Question Presented: (1) Whether the biennial limit on contributions to non-candidate
committees is unconstitutional for lacking a constitutionally cognizable interest as applied to
contributions to national party committees; (2) whether the biennial limits on contributions to
non-candidate committees are unconstitutional facially for lacking a constitutionally cognizable
interest; (3) whether the biennial limits on contributions to non-candidate committees are
unconstitutionally too low, as applied and facially; and (4) whether the biennial limit on
contributions to candidate committees is unconstitutional for lacking a constitutionally
cognizable interest.

Shaun MCCUTCHEON, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, Defendant.
United States District Court, District of Columbia
Decided on September 28, 2012
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
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BROWN, Circuit Judge
Congress enacted the Federal Elections
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) to “promote
fair practices in the conduct of election
campaigns for Federal political offices.”
Since 1972, the law has changed
significantly. The current iteration of FECA
imposes contribution limits stratified to
track both the identity of the contributor and
the identity of the receiver. Individuals,
however, cannot necessarily contribute as
much as they might wish within these limits;
they, and only they, must comply with a
second regulatory tier: a set of aggregate
contribution limits.
Plaintiffs Shaun
McCutcheon and the Republican National
Committee (“RNC”) now challenge these
aggregate limits as unconstitutional. We
reject their challenge.
I. Background
A. Legal Background
In 1974, Congress amended FECA to
prohibit persons from contributing more
than $1,000 to any political candidate,
individuals from contributing more than an
aggregate of $25,000 in any calendar year,
and political committees from contributing
more than $5,000 to any political candidate.
The Supreme Court ultimately upheld these
contribution limits in the face of a First
Amendment challenge, though it struck
down FECA’s expenditure limits [in
Buckley v. Valeo]. A few months after the
Buckley Court handed down its decision,
Congress amended FECA to distinguish (1)
between contributions by persons and
contributions by multicandidate political
committees, and (2) among contributions to

candidates and their authorized committees,
contributions to national political party
committees, and contributions to all other
political committees. Congress left the
$25,000 aggregate limit on individuals’
contributions untouched, however, until the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA), which replaced the $25,000
aggregate limit with the bifurcated limiting
scheme that Plaintiffs now challenge. There
are thus two sets of contribution limits: base
limits calibrated to the identity of the
contributor regulating how much the
contributor may give to specified categories
of recipients, and a set of aggregate limits
regulating the total amount an individual
may contribute in any two-year election
cycle. Some (but not all) of these limits are
periodically indexed for inflation.
The default base limits apply to
contributions by “persons,” that is,
individuals,
partnerships,
committees,
associations, corporations, unions, and other
organizations. FECA currently prohibits
persons from contributing more than $2,500
per election to any given candidate or that
candidate’s agent or authorized committee;
more than $30,800 in any calendar year to
each of a national political party’s national
committee, House campaign committee, and
Senate campaign committee; more than
$10,000 in any calendar year to a state party
political committee; and more than $5,000
in any calendar year to any other political
committee.
These base contribution limits do not limit
how much a contributor can contribute as
long as the contributions remain within the
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limits for each recipient. Under the base
contribution limits, for example, an
individual might contribute $3.5 million to
one party and its affiliated committees in a
single election cycle. The aggregate limits
prevent this. During each two-year period
starting in an odd-numbered year, no
individual may contribute more than an
aggregate of $46,200 to candidates and their
authorized committees or more than $70,800
to anyone else. Of that $70,800, no more
than $46,200 may be contributions to
political committees that are not national
political party committees. These aggregate
limits, which amount to a total biennial limit
of $117,000 thus prevent individuals from
contributing the statutory maximum to more
than eighteen candidates.
FECA includes a number of provisions
designed to prevent evasion of the various
limits. First, anyone who contributes more
than permitted may be subject to civil or
criminal
penalties.
Second,
indirect
contributions,
such
as
earmarked
contributions to an intermediary, are deemed
contributions to that candidate.
Third,
FECA prohibits contributions made in the
name of someone else. Finally, contributions
made or received by more than one
“affiliated” committee are deemed to have
been made or received by the same
committee.
B. Factual and Procedural Background
McCutcheon is an Alabama resident eligible
to vote in a U.S. presidential election. Thus
far, during the 2011–2012 election cycle, he
has contributed a total of $33,088 to sixteen
different candidates in amounts ranging

from $1,776 to $2,500 per election; $1,776
to each of the RNC, the National Republican
Senatorial Committee (“NRSC”), and the
National
Republican
Congressional
Committee (“NRCC”); $2,000 to a nonparty
political
committee
(the
Senate
Conservatives Fund); and $20,000 to the
federal account of a state party committee
(the
Alabama
Republican
Party),
McCutcheon, however, wants to contribute
more. He wants to contribute $1,776 to
twelve other candidates and enough money
to the RNC, NRSC, and NRCC to bring his
total contributions up to $25,000 each.
Doing either of these, however, would
violate the aggregate limits: the additional
candidate contributions would amount to
aggregate candidate contributions of
$54,400, and the additional party committee
contributions would amount to aggregate
contributions of $75,000 to national party
committees. McCutcheon assures us he
intends to repeat these donation patterns
during future election cycles.
The RNC, meanwhile, wishes to receive
contributions
from
individuals
like
McCutcheon that would be permissible
under the base limits but violate the
aggregate limit on contributions to party
committees. Because of the aggregate limit,
the RNC has both refused and returned
contributions. The RNC believes that others
would contribute to the RNC but for the
limit. According to the verified complaint,
the RNC does not control either the NRSC
or the NRCC.
Plaintiffs challenge both the $46,200
aggregate limit on candidate contributions
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and the $70,800 aggregate limit on other
contributions under the First Amendment.
They challenge the $46,200 aggregate limit
for being “unsupported by any cognizable
government interest ... at any level of
review” and for being unconstitutionally
low. They challenge the $70,800 aggregate
limit facially, as applied to contributions up
to $30,800 per calendar year to national
party committees, and for being too low,
both facially and as applied to contributions
to national party committees. Plaintiffs also
ask this Court for a preliminary injunction to
enjoin Federal Election Commission
(“FEC”) enforcement of the aggregate
limits. We consolidated the preliminary
injunction hearing with the hearing on the
merits and now resolve both issues.
II. Discussion
A. Level of Scrutiny
Both contribution limits and expenditure
limits implicate “the most fundamental”
First Amendment interests, but each does so
in a different way. The Supreme Court has
accordingly applied different levels of
scrutiny to each: expenditure limits are
subject to strict scrutiny, while contribution
limits will be valid as long as they satisfy
“the lesser demand of being closely drawn
to match a sufficiently important interest.”
The Court has never repudiated this
distinction.
Plaintiffs argue that the aggregate limits
must be subject to strict scrutiny because
laws burdening political speech are subject
to strict scrutiny and the aggregate limits
“similarly ‘burden’ First Amendment
rights.” This syllogism is rooted in Buckley

itself. The Buckley Court did not
unequivocally
hold
that
political
expenditures are speech. Rather, it drew on
the fact that “virtually every means of
communicating ideas in today’s mass
society requires the expenditure of money”
to hold that “[a] restriction on the amount of
money a person or group can spend on
political communication during a campaign
necessarily reduces the quantity of
expression by restricting the number of
issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience
reached.” Thus, the Court suggested,
contribution limits might sometimes
implicate rights of expression in more than a
“marginal” way, like a spiking seismograph
at the onset of an earthquake. More recently,
Citizens United proclaimed that “[l]aws that
burden political speech are ‘subject to strict
scrutiny,’ ” and this Court relied on that
principle to preliminarily enjoin the FEC
from enforcing limits on contributions to a
political committee interested in making
independent expenditures. Although we
acknowledge
the constitutional line
between political speech and political
contributions grows increasingly difficult to
discern, we decline Plaintiffs’ invitation to
anticipate the Supreme Court’s agenda.
Every contribution limit may “logically
reduce[ ] the total amount that the recipient
of the contributions otherwise could spend,”
but for now, “this truism does not mean
limits on contributions are simultaneously
considered limits on expenditures that
therefore receive strict scrutiny.”
Plaintiffs try to escape the consequences of
lesser scrutiny by arguing that the aggregate
limits are actually expenditure limits, not
287

contribution limits. Because § 441a(a)(1)
already establishes base contribution limits,
they say, “added biennial contribution limits
are more appropriately deemed expenditure
limits, subject to strict scrutiny.” They are
wrong.
The
difference
between
contributions and expenditures is the
difference between giving money to an
entity and spending that money directly on
advocacy. Contribution limits are subject to
lower scrutiny because they primarily
implicate the First Amendment rights of
association, not expression, and contributors
remain able to vindicate their associational
interests in other ways; the limits primarily
implicate associational rights rather than
rights of expression because they impose
only a “marginal” restriction on the
contributor’s “ability to engage in free
communication,” they impose only a
marginal restriction on a contributor’s
expressive ability because the expressive
value of a contribution derives from the
“undifferentiated,
symbolic
act
of
communicating,” and the expressive value
of contributions is limited because “the
transformation of contributions into political
debate involves speech by someone other
than the contributor.” The aggregate limits
do not regulate money injected directly into
the nation’s political discourse; the regulated
money goes into a pool from which another
entity draws to fund its advocacy. To break
the chain of legal consequences tied to that
fact would require a judicial act we are not
empowered to perform.
B. The Merits
The government may justify the aggregate
limits as a means of preventing corruption or

the appearance of corruption, or as a means
of preventing circumvention of contribution
limits imposed to further its anticorruption
interest. The Supreme Court has recognized
no other governmental interest “sufficiently
important to outweigh the First Amendment
interests implicated by contributions for
political speech.” “Corruption,” though, is a
narrow term of art: “Elected officials are
influenced to act contrary to their
obligations of office by the prospect of
financial gain to themselves or infusions of
money into their campaigns. The hallmark
of corruption is the financial quid pro quo:
dollars for political favors.” Influence over
or access to elected officials does not
amount to corruption.
Citizens
United
left
unclear
the
constitutionally permissible scope of the
government’s anticorruption interest. It both
restricted the concept of quid-pro-quo
corruption to bribery, and suggested that
there is a wheeling-and-dealing space
between pure bribery and mere influence
and access where elected officials are
“corrupt” for acting contrary to their
representative obligations. Yet if anything is
clear, it is that contributing a large amount
of money does not ipso facto implicate the
government’s anticorruption interest. The
government’s
assertion
that
large
contributions “could easily exert a
corrupting influence on the democratic
system” and would present “the appearance
of corruption that is ‘inherent in a regime of
large individual financial contributions’ ”
simply sweeps too broadly. McCutcheon
alleges that he has “deeply held principles
regarding government and public policy,”
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believing that “the United States is slowly
but surely losing its character as an
exceptional nation that stands for liberty and
limited government under the Constitution.”
He wants to contribute to a number of
candidates “who are interested in advancing
the cause of liberty.” Supporting general
principles of governance does not bespeak
corruption; such is democracy. “It is in the
nature of an elected representative to favor
certain policies, and, by necessary corollary,
to favor the voters and contributors who
support those policies.”
Plaintiffs do not, however, challenge the
base contribution limits, so we may assume
they are valid expressions of the
government’s anticorruption interest. And
that being so, we cannot ignore the ability of
aggregate limits to prevent evasion of the
base limits. Circumvention, after all, can be
“very hard to trace.” Eliminating the
aggregate limits means an individual might,
for example, give half-a-million dollars in a
single check to a joint fundraising
committee comprising a party’s presidential
candidate, the party’s national party
committee, and most of the party’s state
party committees. After the fundraiser, the
committees are required to divvy the
contributions to ensure that no committee
receives more than its permitted share, but
because party committees may transfer
unlimited amounts of money to other party
committees of the same party, the half-amillion-dollar
contribution
might
nevertheless find its way to a single
committee’s coffers. That committee, in
turn, might use the money for coordinated
expenditures, which have no “significant

functional difference” from the party’s
direct candidate contributions.
The
candidate who knows the coordinated
expenditure funding derives from that single
large check at the joint fundraising event
will know precisely where to lay the wreath
of gratitude.
Gratitude, of course, is not itself a
constitutionally-cognizable
form
of
corruption, and it may seem unlikely that so
many separate entities would willingly serve
as conduits for a single contributor’s
interests. But it is not hard to imagine a
situation where the parties implicitly agree
to such a system, and there is no reason to
think the quid pro quo of an exchange
depends on the number of steps in the
transaction. The Supreme Court has rejected
the argument that Congress cannot restrict
coordinated
spending
as
an
anticircumvention measure because there are
“better crafted safeguards” in place like the
earmarking rules. We follow the Court’s
lead and conceive of the contribution limits
as a coherent system rather than merely a
collection of individual limits stacking
prophylaxis upon prophylaxis.
Given our conclusion that the aggregate
limits are justified, we reject Plaintiffs’
arguments
that
the
limits
are
unconstitutionally
low
and
unconstitutionally overbroad. It is not the
judicial role to parse legislative judgment
about what limits to impose. Only if there
are “danger signs” that the limits are not
closely drawn will we examine the record to
review the statute’s tailoring. We see no
danger signs here. Plaintiffs’ argument
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depends on using “simple arithmetic” to
translate the Vermont contribution limits
invalidated in Randall to imaginary biennial
limits on contributions to party committees
and candidates. They argue that the limit on
contributions to state party committees
invalidated by Randall is equivalent to a
biennial contribution limit of $198,389 to
national party committees, which they
explain is about $14,000 more than the total
amount an individual could biennially
contribute to the three committees—an
amount an individual still cannot contribute
because of the aggregate limits. They
likewise argue that if an individual wanted
to contribute equally to “one candidate of
his choice in all 468 federal races” in 2006,
he would be limited to contributing $85.29
per candidate for the entire election cycle, an
amount “far below the $200 limit held too
low in Randall.” Even granting that
Plaintiffs’ methodology and results are
correct, “the dictates of the First
Amendment are not mere functions of the
Consumer Price Index.” The effect of the
aggregate limits on a challenger’s ability to
wage an effective campaign is limited
because the aggregate limits do not apply to
nonindividuals. And in any event,
individuals remain able to volunteer, join
political associations, and engage in
independent expenditures.

legitimate applications’ ” since neither
political party proliferation nor movement of
“massive” amounts of money through party
committees or PACs to candidates is now
possible. The Buckley Court rejected
challenges that the contribution limits are
overbroad because most contributors are not
seeking a quo for their quid and the base
contribution limit is “unrealistically low.”
Aside from these two claims, which we join
the Buckley Court in rejecting, Plaintiffs do
not explain how the aggregate limits
potentially regulate both protected and
unprotected conduct. Plaintiffs’ overbreadth
argument is essentially a severability claim,
but because we conclude that nothing needs
to be severed, this argument fails.

Plaintiffs’ overbreadth challenge consists of
the conclusory assertions that the aggregate
limits substantially inhibit protected speech
and association “not only in an absolute
sense, but also relative to the scope of the
law’s plainly legitimate applications,” and
that “there is no ‘scope of ... plainly

ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs raise the troubling possibility that
Citizens United undermined the entire
contribution limits scheme, but whether that
case will ultimately spur a new evaluation of
Buckley is a question for the Supreme Court,
not us.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will
issue a contemporaneous Order denying
Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction and granting the FEC’s motion to
dismiss.

For the reasons set forth in the
Memorandum Opinion, it is this 28th day of
September, 2012, hereby ordered that the
Defendant Federal Election Commission’s
motion to dismiss is granted; it is further
ordered that the Plaintiff’s motion for a
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preliminary injunction is dismissed as moot;
and it is further ordered that final judgment
be entered for the defendant.

SO ORDERED
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“Justices Take Case on Overall Limit to Political Donations”
New York Times
Adam Liptak
February 19, 2013
The Supreme Court on Tuesday agreed to
hear a challenge to federal campaign
contribution limits, setting the stage for what
may turn out to be the most important
federal campaign finance case since the
court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United,
which struck down limits on independent
campaign spending by corporations and
unions.
The latest case is an attack on the other main
pillar of federal campaign finance
regulation: limits on contributions made
directly to political candidates and some
political committees.
“In Citizens United, the court resisted
tinkering with the rules for contribution
limits,” said Richard L. Hasen, an expert on
election law at the University of California,
Irvine. “This could be the start of chipping
away at contribution limits.”
The central question is in one way modest
and in another ambitious. It challenges only
aggregate limits — overall caps on
contributions to several candidates or
committees — and does not directly attack
the more familiar basic limits on
contributions to individual candidates or
committees. Should the court agree that
those overall limits are unconstitutional,
however, its decision could represent a
fundamental reassessment of a basic
distinction established in Buckley v. Valeo in

1976, which said contributions may be
regulated more strictly than expenditures
because of their potential for corruption.
The case was brought by Shaun
McCutcheon, an Alabama man, and the
Republican National Committee. Mr.
McCutcheon said he was prepared to abide
by contribution limits to individual
candidates and groups, which are currently
$2,500 per election to federal candidates,
$30,800 per year to national party
committees, $10,000 per year to state party
committees and $5,000 per year to other
political committees. But he said he objected
to separate overall two-year limits, currently
$46,200 for contributions to candidates and
$70,800 for contributions to groups, arguing
that they were unjustified and too low.
He said he had made contributions to 16
federal candidates in recent elections and
had wanted to give money to 12 more. He
said he had also wanted to give $25,000 to
each of three political committees
established by the Republican Party. Each
set of contributions would have put him over
the overall limits.
In September, a special three-judge federal
court in Washington upheld the overall
limits, saying they were justified by the need
to prevent the circumvention of the basic
limits.
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“Although
we
acknowledge
the
constitutional line between political speech
and
political
contributions
grows
increasingly difficult to discern,” Judge
Janice Rogers Brown wrote for the court,
“we decline plaintiffs’ invitation to
anticipate the Supreme Court’s agenda.”
In June, in a brief, unsigned 5-to-4 decision,
the Supreme Court affirmed the Citizens
United ruling, summarily reversing a
decision of the Montana Supreme Court that
had upheld a state law limiting independent
political spending by corporations.
“The question presented in this case is
whether the holding of Citizens United
applies to the Montana state law,” the
opinion said. “There can be no serious doubt
that it does.” Montana’s arguments, the

opinion continued, “either were already
rejected in Citizens United, or fail to
meaningfully distinguish that case.”
In 2006, in Randall v. Sorell, the Supreme
Court struck down Vermont’s contribution
limits, the lowest in the nation, as
unconstitutional. Individuals and political
parties were not allowed to contribute more
than $400 to a candidate for statewide office
over a two-year election cycle, including
primaries. In a brief concurrence, Justice
Samuel A. Alito Jr. said there was no reason
to address the continuing validity of Buckley
v. Valeo in that case, suggesting that a later
case might present the question directly.
The latest case, McCutcheon v. Federal
Election Commission, No. 12-536, may be
that case…
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“Is McCutcheon v. FEC the Next Citizens United?”
Independent Voter Network
Alex Gauthier
February 21, 2013
The Supreme Court announced its decision
Tuesday to hear McCutcheon v. Federal
Election Commission. It will likely become
another landmark case defining campaign
finance and — by extension — the future of
national elections.
At stake are contribution limits to state and
national party committees as well as PACs,
which are biennially capped at $123,200 in
aggregate. An individual can donate to many
different party committees or candidates, but
cannot exceed an overall donation limit
which resets every two years.
McCutcheon’s argument falls along similar
lines as the Citizens United case. He
contends his First Amendment rights are
being infringed upon by not being able to
donate to as many party committees as he
would like.
As it follows, eliminating the biennial
aggregation restrictions could allow a single
individual to donate over $1 million to
political causes in one election cycle — or
two years — according to Democracy 21′s
Fred Wertheimer.
Put simply, national and state/local party
committees can receive a maximum of
$32,400 and $10,000, respectively, each
year from an individual donor. Yet, one
person cannot exceed the $123,200 limit.

A ruling in favor of McCutcheon would
likely remove the biennial aggregation cap.
In effect, this would raise the maximum
annual donation limit to around $500,000
per year, which would nearly quadruple the
current limit.
There remains a clear distinction, however,
between the Citizens United case
and McCutcheon
v
FEC.
An
important rationale for the majority opinion,
authored by Justice Kennedy, was:
“The governmental interest in preventing
corruption and the appearance of
corruption [was] inadequate to justify [the
ban] on independent expenditures.”
This might be a key detail in McCutcheon’s
case. If significantly increasing party
contribution limits is shown to have a
corrupting influence or promote the
appearance of corruption, the Supreme
Court would rule against him.
It remains to be seen how party
contributions will be recognized by the high
court, since non-coordination between Super
PACs and candidates was a critical concept
behind Super PACs being able to infinitely
raise funds.
Party committees have traditionally been
under more scrutiny when it comes to fund
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raising and were not regarded as
independent and thereby labeled as
‘coordinated communications.’ This subjects
them to stricter regulations.
Background
The McCutcheon of McCutcheon v. Federal
Elections Commission is Shaun McCutcheon
of Alabama. He is a conservative activist
and chairman of Conservative Action Fund,
“a Super PAC that promotes conservative
Republicans,” according to the Alabama
GOP.
Mr. McCutcheon spent $33,088 on
conservative candidates and committees —
most of which ($20,000) went to the
Alabama Republican Party — during the
2012 elections. Yet, he wants to be able to
spend more on future elections.

biennial limits for donations McCutcheon
argues are unconstitutional.
Instrumental to how the Supreme Court will
decide the McCutcheon case is Buckley v
Valeo (1976), which is the cornerstone for
campaign finance law and the primary
source used to rationalize the infamous
Citizens United decision.
Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
and Alito ruled in favor of Citizens United
in the 5-4 decision. The dissenters were
Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.
Stevens was replaced by Kagan in 2010, but
McCutcheon’s free speech argument could
very well resonate with the previous
majority, making a ruling in favor of the
plaintiffs more likely.

Looking Ahead

Unsurprisingly,
election
spending
watchdogs like the Campaign Legal Center
are critical of a possible expansion of money
in politics. Senior counsel for the Campaign
Legal Center, Tara Malloy, said in a
statement:

Although
the
Republican
National
Committee is also represented in the case,
both Democratic and Republican Party
committees are forced to turn down
donations every year due to these limits.
This means a decision in favor of the
plaintiffs could dramatically benefit both
parties, not only the GOP.

“It has become readily apparent that there
are a number of justices who are willing to
usurp Congress’s role as legislator when it
comes to matter[s] of campaign finance. An
aggregate contribution limit was passed in
the wake of the Watergate money scandals
and was upheld in the 1976 Supreme Court
decision Buckley v. Valeo.”

The law that will be challenged is the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002.
The BCRA, also known as the “McCainFeingold Act,” established the current

Even though it is primarily Republicans who
are backing the plaintiffs, the Democratic
Party and all political action committees
would benefit from more relaxed

He is currently prohibited from breaching
the aggregate limit on biennial committee
contributions, which is capped at $74,600.
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contribution limits. Raising the limit on the
amount one individual can donate each
election cycle allows fewer donors to
contribute more money.

The decision could not only send
skyrocketing campaign costs even higher,
but strengthen party affiliated coffers as
well, potentially squeezing out third parties
that
don’t
have
recognized
party
committees.
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“Court Upholds Aggregate Federal Contribution Limits”
Inside Political Law
Matthew Connolly
September 28, 2012
Earlier today, a three-judge panel in the U.S.
District Court for the District of
Columbia rejected
a
constitutional
challenge to the Federal Election Campaign
Act’s
(“FECA”)
biennial
aggregate
contribution limits in McCutcheon v. FEC,
No. 12-cv-1034 (D.D.C. Sept. 28,
2012). Under FECA, an individual may
contribute no more than $117,000 in the
aggregate on federal elections in a two-year
election cycle. There are various complex
sub-limits within that overall biennial limit.
Plaintiffs Sean McCutcheon, an Alabama
resident, and the Republican National
Committee challenged these aggregate limits
under the First Amendment as being
unsupported by a legitimate government
interest and for being unconstitutionally low.
As a preliminary matter, the panel declined
to apply the more stringent “strict scrutiny”
standard of review that the Supreme Court
has recently applied to political expenditure
limits, including in Citizens United. Instead,
the panel applied a more lenient standard,
finding that contribution limits are valid if
they are “closely drawn to match a
sufficiently important interest.”
The panel denied plaintiffs’ First
Amendment challenges, finding that the

aggregate
contribution
limits
were
sufficiently tied to the government’s interest
in preventing corruption. Specifically, the
court ruled that aggregate limits were
necessary to prevent circumvention of
FECA’s base limits—the maximum amount
an individual may give to a specific entity,
such as a candidate, political committee, or
national party committee (the plaintiffs did
not challenge the base limits in this case).
Having found that the aggregate limits were
justified, the panel rejected plaintiffs’ claims
that
the
aggregate
limits
are
unconstitutionally low or overbroad. The
panel refused to question the specific limits
imposed by FECA, finding that courts
should defer to Congress unless there are
“danger signs,” which the court determined
are not present with respect to the aggregate
limits.
The FEC’s victory before the district court
is a setback to those who have thought the
biennial limits to be unconstitutional,
especially in the wake of the Citizens
United decision. But the court’s decision
likely will be appealed, and the issue
ultimately will be resolved by the Supreme
Court.

297

“Supreme Court Could Create System of Legalized Bribery in Washington
Depending on Its Decision in McCutcheon Case”
Huffington Post
Fred Wertheimer
February 21, 2013
There are enormous stakes for the country in
the campaign finance case the Supreme
Court agreed to review this week.
If the Supreme Court strikes down the
existing limits on the aggregate amount an
individual can give to all federal candidates
and all party committees in a two-year
election cycle, the Justices will create a
system of legalized bribery in Washington.
Such a decision by the Court would be a
gold mine for big donors interested in
buying government decisions and would
wreak havoc on the interests of ordinary
Americans.
McCutcheon
v.
Federal
Election
Commission, the case to be considered by
the Supreme Court, involves a challenge by
Shaun McCutcheon and the Republican
National Committee to the constitutionality
of the federal aggregate contribution limits,
upheld by the Supreme Court in 1976
in Buckley v. Valeo.
A decision by the Court to reverse that
decision would not only strike down the
aggregate contribution limits enacted in
1974, but would also eviscerate an essential
anti-corruption provision enacted in 2002
and upheld by the Supreme Court in 2003
in McConnell v. FEC. That provision
prohibits a federal officeholder or candidate
from soliciting contributions that do not

comply with the federal contribution limits,
including the aggregate limits.
If the aggregate limits are struck down,
officeholders would be able to directly
solicit the huge contributions from
individual donors that the solicitation ban is
intended to prohibit.
The
Supreme
Court
in
the
landmark Buckley case found that a system
that allowed huge campaign contributions
was an inherently corrupt system. The Court
recognized that contribution limits were
necessary to deal with:
[T]he reality or appearance of corruption
inherent in a system permitting unlimited
financial contributions, even when the
identities of the contributors and the
amounts of their contributions are fully
disclosed.
The Supreme Court in the McConnell case
recognized the inherent dangers of
corruption if federal officeholders are
allowed to solicit huge contributions from
donors. In upholding the constitutionality of
the federal ban on soliciting soft money, the
Court stated:
Large soft-money donations at a
candidate’s or officeholder’s behest give
rise to all of the same corruption
concerns posed by contributions made
directly to the candidate or officeholder.
Though the candidate may not ultimately
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control how the funds are spent, the
value of the donation to the candidate or
officeholder is evident from the fact of
the solicitation itself.
Even Justice Kennedy, who voted to strike
down the other restrictions on soft money,
agreed that the ban on the solicitation of
large soft money contributions by federal
officeholders was constitutional. Kennedy
wrote:
The making of a solicited gift is a quid
both to the recipient of the money and to
the one who solicits the payment (by
granting his request). Rules governing
candidates’ or officeholders’ solicitation
of
contributions
are,
therefore,
regulations governing their receipt of
quids.
This regulation fits under
Buckley’s anti-corruption rationale.
The practical consequences of removing the
aggregate limits are illustrated by the
fundraising that took place in the 2012
presidential elections.
During the last election, because of the
aggregate contribution limits, an individual
could give a maximum total of $70,800 to
party committees and a maximum total of
$46,200 to federal candidates in the twoyear election cycle.
In order to solicit the largest allowable
check from a donor to support his campaign,
President Obama established a joint
fundraising account, the Obama Victory
Fund.
The
President
solicited
individual
contributions for the Fund of up to $75,800
per donor to support his campaign, the

maximum a donor could give to his
campaign and party, which was then divided
up among the president's campaign, the
DNC and several state parties. (Republican
nominee Mitt Romney established a similar
joint fundraising account.)
Take away the aggregate limit on individual
giving to parties and a presidential candidate
in the 2016 election could solicit individual
checks from donors of up to $1,194,000 per
donor to be spent by his party on his
campaign.
Similarly, take away the aggregate total
limit on individual contributions to
candidates and a House Speaker or Senate
Majority Leader could solicit individual
checks from donors of up to $2,433,600 per
donor to be distributed among their
congressional candidates up to $5,200 per
candidate.
Or, any powerful federal officeholder could
solicit individual checks from donors of up
to $3,627,600 per donor for the
officeholder's party committees and
congressional candidates.
It is axiomatic in American politics that
when it comes to raising campaign money,
anything that can legally be done will be
done.
Thus, President Obama solicited checks for
$75,800 for his presidential campaign and
party in 2012, the maximum a donor could
give.
Checks in excess of $1 million, $2 million
and $3 million per donor, the maximums
that a donor could give, will be solicited by
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federal officeholders in future elections if
the aggregate limits on individual
contributions are struck down by the
Supreme Court.
It is simply not possible to have a president
or any other federal officeholder soliciting
individual contributions in excess of $1
million, $2 million or $3 million per donor
without creating opportunities for the
corruption of federal officeholders and
government decisions.
The Buckley and McConnell Supreme Court
decisions and Justice Kennedy in his
concurring
opinion
in McConnell all
recognized this reality.
Despite the profound problems created by
the Supreme Court's misguided decision in
the Citizens United case, furthermore, this

provides no justification for the creation of a
system of legalized bribery that opens the
door wide to the corruption of federal
officeholders and government decisions.
It is time for this Supreme Court to stop
acting like a super legislature.
It is time for this Supreme Court to stop
issuing radical decisions that overturn
decades of national policy designed to
prevent government corruption. A little
respect by this Supreme Court for the
constitutional right of citizens and Congress
to protect the government from corruption is
in order.
Citizens deserve no less.
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U.S. v. Apel
12-1038
Ruling Below: U.S. v. Apel, 676 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2012), cert granted, 133 S.Ct. 2767 (2013).
Appellant John Apel, who was subject to a pre-existing order barring him from Vandenberg Air
Force Base, was convicted of three counts of trespassing on the base in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1382. After his convictions became final in district court, the Ninth Circuit decided United States
v. Parker. Parker held that because a stretch of highway running through Vandenberg AFB is
subject to an easement “granted to the State of California, which later relinquished it to the
County of Santa Barbara,” the federal government lacks the exclusive right of possession of the
area on which the trespass allegedly occurred; therefore, a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1382
could not stand, regardless of an order barring a defendant from the base. The Ninth Circuit
therefore reversed Apel’s convictions as a result of the Parker decision.
Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1382, which prohibits a person from reentering a
military installation after a commanding officer has ordered him not to reenter, may be enforced
on a portion of a military installation that is subject to a public roadway easement.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
John Dennis APEL, Defendant–Appellant.
United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
John Dennis Apel, Defendant–Appellant.
United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
John Dennis Apel, Defendant–Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
Decided on April 25, 2012
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
PER CURIAM
Appellant John Apel, who was subject to a
pre-existing order barring him from
Vandenberg Air Force Base, was convicted
of three counts of trespassing on the base in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1382. After his

convictions became final in district court,
we decided United States v. Parker. Parker
held that because a stretch of highway
running through Vandenberg AFB is subject
to an easement “granted to the State of
California, which later relinquished it to the
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County of Santa Barbara,” the federal
government lacks the exclusive right of
possession of the area on which the trespass
allegedly occurred; therefore, a conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 1382 cannot stand,
regardless of an order barring a defendant
from the base.

Although we question the correctness of
Parker, it is binding, dispositive of this
appeal, and requires that Apel's convictions
be REVERSED.
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“Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Military Protester Case”
Reuters
Lawrence Hurley
June 3, 2013
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to
consider whether a protester who was barred
from a military base in California violated a
federal law when he took part in
demonstrations on a public roadway that
crosses government-owned land.
The government asked the justices to
overturn a lower court ruling in favor of the
protester, John Apel. He successfully argued
in a federal appeals court that the law, which
prevents people from re-entering bases after
they are barred, applies only to land over
which the military has exclusive authority.
Apel, who protested against nuclear
weapons, was barred from Vandenberg Air
Force Base but continued to attend
demonstrations outside the base entrance.
The public roadway on which the protests
took place is located on land owned by the

government. Apel was convicted of three
counts of trespassing on the base.
The appeals court in San Francisco reversed
the convictions, ruling that the government
did not have an exclusive right of possession
of the area where the alleged trespass took
place.
In asking the justices to hear the case, U.S.
Solicitor General Donald Verrilli wrote in
court papers that the government "will be
unable to fully enforce a significant federal
criminal statute on many military bases" if
the ruling was left to stand.
Oral arguments and a ruling are due in the
court's next term, which begins in October
and ends in June 2014.
The case is U.S. v. Apel, U.S. Supreme
Court, No. 12-1038.
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National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning
12-1281
Ruling Below: Noel Canning v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 705 F.3d 490, (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, 2013 WL 1774240 (U.S. 2013).
Noel Canning petitions for review of a National Labor Relations Board decision finding that
Noel Canning violated sections of the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to reduce to
writing and execute a collective bargaining agreement reached with Teamsters Local 760. NLRB
cross-petitions for enforcement of its order. On the merits of the NLRB decision, petitioner
argues that the Board did not properly follow applicable contract law in determining that an
agreement had been reached and that therefore, the finding of unfair labor practice is erroneous.
Questions Presented: (1) Whether the President’s recess-appointment power may be exercised
during a recess that occurs within a session of the Senate, or is instead limited to recesses that
occur between enumerated sessions of the Senate; (2) whether the President’s recessappointment power may be exercised to fill vacancies that exist during a recess, or is instead
limited to vacancies that first arose during that recess; and (3) whether the President's recessappointment power may be exercised when the Senate is convening every three days in pro
forma sessions.

NOEL CANNING, a Division of the Noel Corporation, Petitioner
v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit
Decided on January 25, 2013
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
SENTELLE, Chief Judge
Noel Canning petitions for review of a
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”
or “the Board”) decision finding that Noel
Canning violated section 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”) by refusing to reduce to writing
and execute a collective bargaining
agreement reached with Teamsters Local
760 (“the Union”). NLRB cross-petitions

for enforcement of its order. On the merits
of the NLRB decision, petitioner argues that
the Board did not properly follow applicable
contract law in determining that an
agreement had been reached and that
therefore, the finding of unfair labor practice
is erroneous. We determine that the Board
issuing the findings and order could not
lawfully act, as it did not have a quorum, for
reasons set forth more fully below.
I. INTRODUCTION
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At its inception, this appears to be a routine
review of a decision of the National Labor
Relations Board over which we have
jurisdiction
under 29
U.S.C.
§
160(e) and (f), providing that petitions for
review of Board orders may be filed in this
court. The Board issued its order on
February 8, 2012. On February 24, 2012, the
company filed a petition for review in this
court, and the Board filed its crossapplication for enforcement on March 20,
2012. While the posture of the petition is
routine, as it developed, our review is not. In
its brief before us, Noel Canning
…questions the authority of the Board to
issue the order on two constitutional
grounds. First, petitioner asserts that the
Board lacked authority to act for want of a
quorum, as three members of the fivemember Board were never validly appointed
because they took office under putative
recess appointments which were made when
the Senate was not in recess. Second, it
asserts that the vacancies these three
members purportedly filled did not “happen
during the Recess of the Senate,” as required
for
recess
appointments
by
the
Constitution. Because the Board must have
a quorum in order to lawfully take action, if
petitioner is correct in either of these
assertions, then the order under review is
void ab initio.
Before we can even consider the
constitutional issues, however, we must first
rule on statutory objections to the Board's
order raised by Noel Canning. … We must
decide whether Noel Canning is entitled to
relief on the basis of its nonconstitutional
arguments
before
addressing
the
constitutional question. Noel Canning raises

two statutory arguments. First, it contends
that the ALJ's conclusion that the parties in
fact reached an agreement at their final
negotiation session is not supported by
substantial evidence. Second, it argues that
even if such an agreement were reached, it is
unenforceable under Washington law. We
address each argument in turn.
A. The Sufficiency of the Evidence
Refusal to execute a written collective
bargaining agreement incorporating terms
agreed upon during negotiations is an unfair
labor practice under section 8(a)(1) and (5)
of the NLRA. Whether the parties reached
an agreement during negotiations is a
question of fact. We therefore must affirm
the Board's conclusion that an agreement
was in fact reached if that conclusion is
supported by substantial evidence.
Noel Canning and the Union had in the past
enjoyed a long collective bargaining
relationship, but the parties were unable to
reach a new agreement before their most
recent one expired in April 2010.
Negotiations began in June 2010. By the
time the parties met for their final
negotiation session in December 2010, all
issues save wages and pensions had been
resolved. According to notes taken by Union
negotiators at the parties' final negotiating
session, the parties agreed to present two
alternative contract proposals to the Union
membership: one preferred by Noel Canning
management and the other by the
Union. Each proposal included wage and
pension increases but allocated the increases
differently. The notes reveal that the Union
proposal put no limit on the membership's

305

right to decide how much of the $0.40 per
hour pay increase to allocate to its pension
fund. According to the notes and Union
witnesses, the parties agreed that both
proposals would be submitted to the Union
membership for a ratification vote and that
the parties would be bound by the outcome
of that vote. Union negotiators testified that
after the parties read aloud the terms of the
two proposals, Noel Canning's president
stood and said “let's do it.”…
The next day, Noel Canning management
emailed the Union the wage and pension
terms of the two proposals. According to the
email, however, the Union proposal capped
at $0.10 the amount of the $0.40 pay
increase that the membership could devote
to its pension fund. The email thus
conflicted with the Union negotiators' notes,
which left the allocation question entirely to
the membership. When the chief Union
negotiator, Bob Koerner, called Noel
Canning's president to discuss the
discrepancy, the president responded that
since the agreement was not in writing, it
was not binding. The vote took place
anyway, and the membership ratified the
Union's preferred proposal, which allocated
the entire pay increase to the pension fund.
Noel Canning posted a letter informing the
Union that the company considered the
ratification vote to be a counteroffer, which
the company rejected, and declared the
parties to be at an impasse. Noel Canning
subsequently refused to execute a written
agreement embodying the terms ratified by
the Union.

to execute the written agreement. After a
two-day hearing, the ALJ determined that
the parties had in fact achieved consensus ad
idem as to the terms of the Union's preferred
proposal and that Noel Canning's refusal to
execute the written agreement constituted an
unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the NLRA. The ALJ ordered Noel
Canning to sign the collective bargaining
agreement. Noel Canning timely filed
exceptions to the ALJ's decision, and the
Board affirmed.
Unsurprisingly, the parties' testimony at the
ALJ hearing conflicted over whether the
parties in fact agreed to the terms of the
Union proposal. The ALJ's decision thus
rested almost entirely on his determination
of the witnesses' credibility. Assessing the
conflicting testimony, the ALJ determined
that because the Union witnesses' testimony
was corroborated by contemporaneous notes
taken during the December 2010 negotiation
session, the Union's witnesses were credible.
In contrast, he determined that Noel
Canning's witnesses were not credible …
We are loath to overturn the credibility
determinations of an ALJ unless they are
“hopelessly incredible, self-contradictory, or
patently insupportable.” Here, the ALJ
chose the corroborated testimony of Union
negotiators over the unsupported testimony
of Noel Canning employees. And given
undisputed testimony that at least one Noel
Canning representative took notes of the
meeting, the ALJ weighed Noel Canning's
failure to corroborate its testimony against
it.

The Union filed an unfair labor practice
charge premised on Noel Canning's refusal
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Noel Canning nevertheless claims that
Koerner's testimony is plagued by
inconsistencies. But the inconsistencies and
contradictions it identifies are either
irrelevant or merely the result of the
competing testimony of the two parties'
witnesses. There is nothing in the Union
testimony—corroborated
by
contemporaneous notes—that hints at
hopeless incredibility or self-contradiction.
Noel Canning thus relies on what it alleges
to be an inconsistency between Koerner's
testimony and his affidavit. The affidavit,
which is not in the record, apparently
contained the following sentence, referring
to the parties' tentative agreement as “TA”:
“I was voting the contract on Wednesday
and that I would vote what we TA'd during
the December 8th meeting—noting different
than TA'd.” When asked at the ALJ hearing
if he saw any errors in his affidavit, Koerner
claimed he saw none but struggled to
explain what the language meant. Noel
Canning contends that the affidavit is an
explicit admission that Koerner presented an
offer to the Union that was materially
different from the one agreed upon by the
parties and therefore contradicts his
testimony. The ALJ rejected Noel Canning's
interpretation, concluding that the sentence
suffered from a typographical error—
“noting” should have been “nothing”—and
that the error accounted for the witness's
inability to explain the affidavit's meaning.
We conceive of no reason to disagree. As
written, the language of the affidavit is
confusing and becomes intelligible only if
the typographical error pointed out by the
ALJ is corrected. Moreover, the ALJ

specifically determined that the witness was
confused by the affidavit, not that he was
trying to conceal deception, as Noel
Canning contends.
B. The Enforceability of the Contract
We also agree with the Board that we lack
jurisdiction to consider Noel Canning's
choice of law argument. Section 10(e) of the
NLRA forbids us from exercising
jurisdiction to hear any “objection that has
not been urged before the Board.” The ALJ
specifically rejected Noel Canning's
argument that he should apply Washington
state law to decide whether the contract
could be enforced. In its exceptions to the
Board, however, Noel Canning did not
mention Washington law. Although Noel
Canning contended that the ALJ incorrectly
determined that the parties had in fact
reached consensus
ad
idem during
negotiations, it nowhere argued that the ALJ
made an incorrect choice of law to govern
the contracts issue.
“While we have not required that the ground
for the exception be stated explicitly in the
written exceptions filed with the Board, we
have required, at a minimum, that the
ground for the exception be evident by the
context in which the exception is raised.”
Nothing in Noel Canning's exceptions even
hints that it objected to the application of
federal law. On the contrary, it conceded to
the Board that “[i]t is not in dispute that an
employer violates [the NLRA] by refusing
to execute a Collective Bargaining
Agreement incorporating all of the terms
agreed upon by the parties during
negotiations.” We therefore lack jurisdiction
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to consider Noel Canning's state-law
argument because its objections were not
“adequate to put the Board on notice that the
issue might be pursued on appeal.” Having
determined that Noel Canning does not
prevail on its statutory challenges,
consideration of the constitutional question
is unavoidable, and we proceed to its
resolution.
Because we agree that petitioner is correct in
both of its constitutional arguments, we
grant the petition of Noel Canning for
review and deny the Board's petition for
enforcement.
II. JURISDICTION
…We note at the outset that there is a
serious argument to be made against our
having jurisdiction over the constitutional
issues. Section 10(e) of the NLRA,
governing judicial review of the Board's
judgments and petitions for enforcement,
provides: “No objection that has not been
urged before the Board ... shall be
considered by the court, unless the failure or
neglect to urge such objection shall be
excused
because
of
extraordinary
circumstances.” The record reflects no
attempt by petitioner to raise the threshold
issues related to the recess appointments
before the Board. Our first question, then, is
whether this failure to urge the objection
before the Board comes within the exception
for “extraordinary circumstances.” We hold
that it does….

III.
THE
PROCEEDINGS

UNDERLYING

Petitioner is a bottler and distributor of
Pepsi–Cola products and is an employer
within the terms of the NLRA. As discussed,
an NLRB administrative law judge
concluded that Noel Canning had violated
the NLRA. After Noel Canning filed
exceptions to the ALJ's findings, a threemember panel of the Board, composed of
Members Hayes, Flynn, and Block, affirmed
those findings in a decision dated February
8, 2012.
On that date, the Board purportedly had five
members. Two members, Chairman Mark G.
Pearce and Brian Hayes, had been
confirmed by the Senate on June 22, 2010. It
is undisputed that they remained validly
appointed Board members on February 8,
2012.
The other three members were all appointed
by the President on January 4, 2012,
purportedly pursuant to the Recess
Appointments Clause of the Constitution.
The first of these three members, Sharon
Block, filled a seat that became vacant on
January 3, 2012, when Board member Craig
Becker's recess appointment expired.
The second of the three members, Terence
F. Flynn, filled a seat that became vacant on
August 27, 2010, when Peter Schaumber's
term expired. The third, Richard F. Griffin,
filled a seat that became vacant on August
27, 2011, when Wilma B. Liebman's term
expired.
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At the time of the President's purported
recess appointments of the three Board
members, the Senate was operating pursuant
to a unanimous consent agreement, which
provided that the Senate would meet in pro
forma sessions every three business days
from December 20, 2011, through January
22, 2012. The agreement stated that “no
business [would be] conducted” during
those sessions. During the December 23 pro
forma session, the Senate overrode its prior
agreement by unanimous consent and passed
a temporary extension to the payroll tax.
During the January 3 pro forma session, the
Senate acted to convene the second session
of the 112th Congress and to fulfill its
constitutional duty to meet on January 3.
Noel Canning asserts that the Board did not
have a quorum for the conduct of business
on the operative date, February 8, 2012.
Citing New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB,
which holds that the Board cannot act
without a quorum of three members, Noel
Canning asserts that the Board lacked a
quorum on that date. Noel Canning argues
that the purported appointments of the last
three members of the Board were invalid
under the Recess Appointments Clause of
the Constitution, Article II, Section 2,
Clause 3. Because we agree that the
appointments were constitutionally invalid
and the Board therefore lacked a quorum,
we grant the petition for review and vacate
the Board's order.
IV. ANALYSIS
It is undisputed that the Board must have a
quorum of three in order to take action. It is
further undisputed that a quorum of three

did not exist on the date of the order under
review unless the three disputed members
(or at least one of them) were validly
appointed. It is further agreed that the
members of the Board are “Officers of the
United States” within the meaning of the
Appointments Clause of the Constitution,
which provides that the President “shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and
all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law.” Finally, it is
undisputed that the purported appointments
of the three members were not made “by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.”
This does not, however, end the dispute. The
Board contends that despite the failure of the
President to comply with Article II, Section
2, Clause 2, he nonetheless validly made the
appointments under a provision sometimes
referred to as the “Recess Appointments
Clause,” which provides that “[t]he
President shall have Power to fill up all
Vacancies that may happen during the
Recess of the Senate, by granting
Commissions which shall expire at the End
of their next Session.” Noel Canning
contends
that
the
putative
recess
appointments are invalid and the Recess
Appointments Clause is inapplicable
because the Senate was not in the recess at
the time of the putative appointments and
the vacancies did not happen during the
recess of the Senate. We consider those
issues in turn.
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A. The Meaning of “the Recess”
Noel Canning contends that the term “the
Recess” in the Recess Appointments Clause
refers to the intersession recess of the
Senate, that is to say, the period between
sessions of the Senate when the Senate is by
definition not in session and therefore
unavailable to receive and act upon
nominations from the President. The Board's
position is much less clear. It argues that the
alternative appointment procedure created
by that Clause is available during
intrasession “recesses, or breaks in the
Senate's business when it is otherwise in a
continuing session. The Board never states
how short a break is too short, under its
theory, to serve as a “recess” for purposes of
the Recess Appointments Clause. This
merely reflects the Board's larger problem: it
fails to differentiate between “recesses” and
the actual constitutional language, “the
Recess.”
It is this difference between the word choice
“recess” and “the Recess” that first draws
our attention. When interpreting a
constitutional provision, we must look to the
natural meaning of the text as it would have
been understood at the time of the
ratification of the Constitution. Then, as
now, the word “the” was and is a definite
article. Unlike “a” or “an,” that definite
article suggests specificity. As a matter of
cold, unadorned logic, it makes no sense to
adopt the Board's proposition that when the
Framers said “the Recess,” what they really
meant was “a recess.” This is not an
insignificant distinction. In the end it makes
all the difference.

Six times the Constitution uses some form
of the verb “adjourn” or the noun
“adjournment” to refer to breaks in the
proceedings of one or both Houses of
Congress. Twice, it uses the term “the
Recess”: once in the Recess Appointments
Clause and once in the Senate Vacancies
Clause. Not only did the Framers use a
different word, but none of the
“adjournment” usages is preceded by the
definite article. All this points to the
inescapable conclusion that the Framers
intended something specific by the term “the
Recess,” and that it was something different
than a generic break in proceedings.
The structure of the Clause is to the same
effect. The Clause sets a time limit on recess
appointments by providing that those
commissions shall expire “at the End of
their [the Senate's] next Session.” Again, the
Framers have created a dichotomy. The
appointment may be made in “the Recess,”
but it ends at the end of the next “Session.”
The natural interpretation of the Clause is
that the Constitution is noting a difference
between “the Recess” and the “Session.”
Either the Senate is in session, or it is in the
recess. If it has broken for three days within
an ongoing session, it is not in “the Recess.”
It is universally accepted that “Session” here
refers to the usually two or sometimes three
sessions per Congress. Therefore, “the
Recess” should be taken to mean only times
when the Senate is not in one of those
sessions. Confirming this reciprocal
meaning, the First Congress passed a
compensation bill that provided the Senate's
engrossing clerk “two dollars per day during
the session, with the like compensation to
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such clerk while he shall be necessarily
employed in the recess.”
Not only logic and language, but also
constitutional
history
supports
the
interpretation advanced by Noel Canning,
not that of the Board….
[T]he Supreme Court has used analogous
state constitutional provisions to inform its
interpretation of the Constitution. For
example, in Collins v. Youngblood, the
Court considered several early state
constitutions in discerning “the original
understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause”
because “they appear to have been a basis
for the Framers' understanding of the
provision.”
The
North
Carolina
Constitution, which contains the state
constitutional provision most similar to the
Recess Appointments Clause and thus likely
served as the Clause's model, supports the
intersession interpretation. It provides:
That in every case where any officer, the
right of whose appointment is by this
Constitution vested in the General
Assembly, shall, during their recess, die, or
his office by other means become vacant,
the Governor shall have power, with the
advice of the Council of State, to fill up such
vacancy, by granting a temporary
commission, which shall expire at the end of
the next session of the General Assembly.
This
provision,
like
the
Recess
Appointments Clause, describes a singular
recess and does not use the word
“adjournment.” And an 1819 North Carolina
Supreme Court case dealing with this
provision implies that the provision was

seen as differentiating between “the session
of the General Assembly” and “the recess of
the General Assembly.”
The Board argues that “the Company's view
would
...
upend
the
established
constitutional balance of power between the
Senate and the President with respect to
presidential appointments.” However, the
Board's
view
of
“the
established
constitutional balance” is neither so well
established nor so clear as the Board seems
to think. In fact, the historical role of the
Recess Appointments Clause is neither clear
nor consistent.
The interpretation of the Clause in the years
immediately following the Constitution's
ratification is the most instructive historical
analysis in discerning the original meaning.
… With respect to the Recess Appointments
Clause, historical practice strongly supports
the intersession interpretation. The available
evidence shows that no President attempted
to make an intrasession recess appointment
for 80 years after the Constitution was
ratified. The first intrasession recess
appointment probably did not come until
1867, when President Andrew Johnson
apparently appointed one district court judge
during an intrasession adjournment. …
Whatever the precise number of putative
intrasession recess appointments before
1947, it is well established that for at least
80 years after the ratification of the
Constitution, no President attempted such an
appointment, and for decades thereafter,
such appointments were exceedingly rare.
The Supreme Court in Printz v. United
States, exploring the reach of federal power
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over the states, deemed it significant that the
early Congress had not attempted to exercise
the questioned power. Paralleling the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Printz, we
conclude that the infrequency of intrasession
recess appointments during the first 150
years of the Republic “suggests an
assumed absence of [the] power” to make
such appointments. …
While the Board seeks support for its
interpretation in the practices of more recent
administrations, we do not find those
practices persuasive. We note that in INS v.
Chadha, when the Supreme Court was
considering the constitutionality of a onehouse veto, it considered a similar argument
concerning the increasing frequency of such
legislative veto provisions. In rejecting that
argument, the Chadha Court stated that “our
inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by
the fact that congressional veto provisions
are
appearing
with
increasing
frequency....” Like the Supreme Court
in Chadha, we conclude that practice of a
more recent vintage is less compelling than
historical practice dating back to the era of
the Framers….
The Constitution's overall appointments
structure provides additional confirmation of
the intersession interpretation. The Framers
emphasized that the recess appointment
power served only as a stopgap for times
when the Senate was unable to provide
advice and consent. Hamilton wrote
in Federalist No. 67 that advice and consent
“declares the general mode of appointing
officers of the United States,” while the
Recess Appointments Clause serves as
“nothing more than a supplement to the

other for the purpose of establishing an
auxiliary method of appointment, in cases to
which the general method was inadequate.”
The “general mode” of participation of the
Senate through advice and consent served an
important function: “It would be an
excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in
the President, and would tend greatly to
prevent the appointment of unfit characters
from State prejudice, from family
connection, from personal attachment, or
from a view to popularity.”
Nonetheless, the Framers recognized that
they needed some temporary method for
appointment when the Senate was in the
recess. At the time of the Constitution,
intersession recesses were regularly six to
nine months, and senators did not have the
luxury of catching the next flight to
Washington. To avoid government paralysis
in those long periods when senators were
unable to provide advice and consent, the
Framers established the “auxiliary” method
of recess appointments. But they put strict
limits on this method, requiring that the
relevant vacancies happen during “the
Recess.” It would have made little sense to
extend this “auxiliary” method to any
intrasession break, for the “auxiliary” ability
to make recess appointments could easily
swallow the “general” route of advice and
consent. The President could simply wait
until the Senate took an intrasession break to
make appointments, and thus “advice and
consent” would hardly restrain his
appointment choices at all.
To adopt the Board's proffered intrasession
interpretation of “the Recess” would wholly
defeat the purpose of the Framers in the
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careful separation of powers structure
reflected in the Appointments Clause. … In
short, the Constitution's appointments
structure—the general method of advice and
consent modified only by a limited recess
appointments power when the Senate simply
cannot provide advice and consent—makes
clear that the Framers used “the Recess” to
refer only to the recess between sessions.
Confirming this understanding of the Recess
Appointments Clause is the lack of a viable
alternative interpretation of “the Recess.”
The first alternative interpretation is that
“the Recess” refers to all Senate breaks. But
no party presses that interpretation, and for
good reason. …
The second possible interpretation is that
“the Recess” is a practical term that refers to
some substantial passage of time, such as a
ten- or twenty-day break. Attorney General
Daugherty seemed to abandon the
intersession interpretation in 1921 and
adopted this functional interpretation,
arguing that “[t]o give the word ‘recess' a
technical and not a practical construction, is
to disregard substance for form.” Daugherty
refused to put an exact time on the length of
the break necessary for a “Recess,” stating
that “[i]n the very nature of things the line of
demarcation can not be accurately drawn.”
We must reject Attorney General
Daugherty's vague alternative in favor of the
clarity of the intersession interpretation. As
the Supreme Court has observed, when
interpreting “major features” of the
Constitution's separation of powers, we must
“establish[ ] high walls and clear distinctions
because low walls and vague distinctions

will not be judicially defensible in the heat
of interbranch conflict.” Thus, the inherent
vagueness of Daugherty's interpretation
counsels against it….
A third alternative interpretation of “the
Recess” is that it means any adjournment of
more than three days pursuant to the
Adjournments Clause. This interpretation
lacks any constitutional basis….
The fourth and final possible interpretation
of “the Recess,” advocated by the Office of
Legal Counsel, is a variation of the
functional interpretation in which the
President has discretion to determine that the
Senate is in recess. This will not do.
Allowing the President to define the scope
of his own appointments power would
eviscerate the Constitution's separation of
powers. The checks and balances that the
Constitution places on each branch of
government serve as “self-executing
safeguard[s] against the encroachment or
aggrandizement of one branch at the
expense of the other.” …
The Board's arguments supporting the
intrasession
interpretation
are
not
convincing. The Board relies on an Eleventh
Circuit opinion holding that “the Recess”
includes
intrasession
recesses.
The Evans court
explained
that
contemporaneous
dictionaries
defined
“recess” broadly as “remission and
suspension of any procedure.” The court
also dismissed the importance of the definite
article “the,” discounted the Constitution's
distinction between “adjournment” and
“Recess” by interpreting “adjournment” as a
parliamentary action, and emphasized the
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prevalence
of
intrasession
appointments in recent years.

recess

While we respect our sister circuit, we find
the Evans opinion unconvincing. Initially,
we note that the Eleventh Circuit's analysis
was premised on an incomplete statement of
the Recess Appointments Clause's purpose:
“to enable the President to fill vacancies to
assure the proper functioning of our
government.” This statement omits a crucial
element of the Clause, which enables the
President to fill vacancies only when the
Senate is unable to provide advice and
consent.… As written, the Eleventh Circuit's
statement disregards the full structure of the
Constitution's
appointments
provision,
which makes clear that the recess
appointments method is secondary to the
primary method of advice and consent. The
very existence of the advice and consent
requirement highlights the incompleteness
of the Eleventh Circuit's broad statement of
constitutional purpose.
Nor are we convinced by the Eleventh
Circuit's more specific arguments. First, the
natural meaning of “the Recess” is more
limited than the broad dictionary definition
of “recess.” In context, “the Recess” refers
to a specific state of the legislature, so
sources other than general dictionaries are
more helpful in elucidating the term's
original public meaning. Indeed, it is telling
that even the Board concedes that “Recess”
does not mean all breaks.
Second, the Eleventh Circuit fails to explain
the use of the singular “Recess,” and it
underestimates the significance of the
definite article “the” preceding “Recess” by

relying on twentieth-century dictionaries to
argue that “the” can come before a generic
term. Contemporaneous dictionaries treated
“the” as “noting a particular thing.”
Third,
as
the
Eleventh
Circuit
acknowledged, the Supreme Court has
suggested that the Constitution does not in
fact only use “adjournment” to denote
parliamentary action. …
Finally, we would make explicit what we
have implied earlier. The dearth of
intrasession appointments in the years and
decades following the ratification of the
Constitution speaks far more impressively
than the history of recent presidential
exercise of a supposed power to make such
appointments. Recent Presidents are doing
no
more
than
interpreting
the
Constitution. While we recognize that all
branches of government must of necessity
exercise their understanding of the
Constitution in order to perform their duties
faithfully thereto, ultimately it is our role to
discern the authoritative meaning of the
supreme law….
In short, we hold that “the Recess” is limited
to intersession recesses. The Board
conceded at oral argument that the
appointments at issue were not made during
the intersession recess: the President made
his three appointments to the Board on
January 4, 2012, after Congress began a new
session on January 3 and while that new
session continued. Considering the text,
history, and structure of the Constitution,
these appointments were invalid from their
inception. Because the Board lacked a
quorum of three members when it issued its
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decision in this case on February 8, 2012, its
decision must be vacated.
B. Meaning of “Happen”
Although our holding on the first
constitutional argument of the petitioner is
sufficient to compel a decision vacating the
Board's order, as we suggested above, we
also agree that the petitioner is correct in its
understanding of the meaning of the word
“happen” in the Recess Appointments
Clause. The Clause permits only the filling
up of “Vacancies that may happen during
the Recess of the Senate.” Our decision on
this issue depends on the meaning of the
constitutional language “that may happen
during the Recess.” The company contends
that “happen” means “arise” or “begin” or
“come into being.” The Board, on the other
hand, contends that the President may fill up
any vacancies that “happen to exist” during
“the Recess.” It is our firm conviction that
the appointments did not occur during “the
Recess.” We proceed now to determine
whether the appointments are also invalid as
the vacancies did not “happen” during “the
Recess.”
In determining the meaning of “happen” in
the Recess Appointments Clause, we begin
our analysis as we did in the first issue by
looking to the natural meaning of the text as
it would have been understood at the time of
the ratification of the Constitution. Upon a
simple reading of the language itself, we
conclude that the word “happen” could not
logically have encompassed any vacancies
that happened to exist during “the Recess.”
If the language were to be construed as the
Board advocates, the operative phrase “that

may happen” would be wholly unnecessary.
Under the Board's interpretation, the
vacancy need merely exist during “the
Recess” to trigger the President's recess
appointment
power. The
Board's
interpretation would apply with equal force,
however, irrespective of the phrase “that
may happen.” Its interpretation therefore
deprives that phrase of any force. By
effectively reading the phrase out of the
Clause, the Board's interpretation once again
runs afoul of the principle that every phrase
of the Constitution must be given effect.
For our logical analysis of the language with
respect to the meaning of “happen” to be
controlling, we must establish that it is
consistent with the understanding of the
word contemporaneous with the ratification.
Dictionaries at the time of the Constitution
defined “happen” as “[t]o fall out; to chance;
to come to pass.” A vacancy happens, or
“come[s] to pass,” only when it first arises,
demonstrating that the Recess Appointments
Clause requires that the relevant vacancy
arise during the recess….
In addition to the logic of the language,
there is ample other support for this
conclusion. First, we repair again to
examination of the structure of the
Constitution. If we accept the Board's
construction, we eviscerate the primary
mode of appointments set forth in Article II,
Section 2, Clause 2. It would have made
little sense to make the primary method of
appointment the cumbersome advice and
consent procedure contemplated by that
Clause if the secondary method would
permit the President to fill up all vacancies
regardless of when the vacancy arose….
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We further note that the “arise”
interpretation is consistent with other usages
of “happen” in the Constitution. Article I,
Section 3, Clause 2, the Senate Vacancies
Clause, provides for the filling of vacancies
in Senate seats. …
It is well established that “inconsistency
[within the Constitution] is to be implied
only where the context clearly requires
it.” Our understanding of the plain meaning
of the Recess Appointments Clause as
requiring that a qualifying vacancy must
have come to pass or arisen “during the
Recess” is consistent with the apparent
meaning of the Senate Vacancies
Clause. The interpretation proffered by the
Board is not.
As with the first issue, we also find that
evidence of the earliest understanding of the
Clause is inconsistent with the Board's
position. It appears that the first President,
who took office shortly after the ratification,
understood the recess appointments power
to extend only to vacancies that arose during
senatorial recess….
In 1792, Edmund Randolph, the first
Attorney General, addressed the issue of an
office that had become vacant during the
session when the Secretary of State sought
his view. Addressing the vacancy,
concluding that it did not “happen” during
the recess, and thereby rejecting the “exist”
interpretation, Randolph wrote:
But
is
it
a
vacancy
which
has happened during the recess of the
Senate? It is now the same and no other
vacancy, than that, which existed on the 2nd.

of April 1792. It commenced therefore on
that day or may be said to have happened on
that day.
Alexander Hamilton, similarly, wrote that
“[i]t is clear, that independent of the
authority of a special law, the President
cannot fill a vacancy which happens during
a session of the Senate.” In March 1814,
Senator Christopher Gore argued that the
Clause's scope is limited to “vacanc[ies] that
may happen during the recess of the
Senate”:
If the vacancy happens at another time, it is
not the case described by the Constitution;
for that specifies the precise space of time
wherein the vacancy must happen, and the
times which define this period bring it
emphatically within the ancient and wellestablished maxim: “Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.”
Additional support for the “arise”
interpretation comes from early interpreters
who understood that the Clause only applied
to vacancies where the office had previously
been occupied, as opposed to vacancies that
existed because the office had been newly
created. Justice Joseph Story explained that
“[t]he word ‘happen’ had relation to some
casualty,” a statement consistent with the
arise interpretation.
We recognize that some circuits have
adopted the “exist” interpretation. Those
courts, however, did not focus their analyses
on the original public meaning of the word
“happen.” In arguing that happen could
mean “exist,” the Evans majority used a
modern dictionary to define “happen” as
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“befall,” and then used the same modern
dictionary to define “befall” as “happen to
be.” As the Evans dissent argued, “[t]his is
at best a strained effort to avoid the available
dictionary evidence.” A modern crossreference is not a contemporary definition.
The Board has offered no dictionaries from
the time of the ratification that define
“happen” consistently with the proffered
definition of “happen to exist.”…
The Evans, Woodley, and Allocco courts all
relied
on
supposed
congressional
acquiescence in the practice of making
recess appointments to offices that were
vacant prior to the recess because 5 U.S.C. §
5503 permits payment to such appointees in
some circumstances.
Section 5503 was passed in 1966. Its similar
predecessor statute was passed in 1940. The
enactment of statutes in 1940 and 1966
sheds no light on the original understanding
of the Constitution. This is particularly true
as prior statutes refused payments of salaries
to all recess appointees whose vacancies
arose during the session. We doubt that our
sister circuits are correct in construing this
legislation as acquiescent. The Framers
placed the power of the purse in the
Congress in large part because the British
experience taught that the appropriations
power was a tool with which the legislature
could resist “the overgrown prerogatives of
the other branches of government.” The
1863 Act constitutes precisely that:
resistance to executive aggrandizement. In
any event, if the Constitution does not
empower the President to make the
appointments, “[n]either Congress nor the

Executive can agree to waive ... structural
protection[s]” in the Appointments Clause.
… The Senate's desires do not determine the
Constitution's meaning. The Constitution's
separation of powers features, of which the
Appointments Clause is one, do not simply
protect one branch from another. These
structural provisions serve to protect
the people, for it is ultimately the people's
rights that suffer when one branch
encroaches on another.…In short, nothing
in 5 U.S.C. § 5503 changes our view that the
original meaning of “happen” is “arise.”
Our sister circuits and the Board contend
that the “arise” interpretation fosters
inefficiencies and leaves open the possibility
of just what is occurring here—that is, a
Board that cannot act for want for a quorum.
The Board also suggests more dire
consequences, arguing that failure to accept
the “exist” interpretation will leave the
President unable to fulfill his chief
constitutional obligation to “take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed,” U.S.
Const. art. II, § 3, and even suggests that the
interpretation we adopt today could pose
national security risks. But if Congress
wished to alleviate such problems, it could
certainly create Board members whose
service extended until the qualification of a
successor, or provide for action by less than
the current quorum, or deal with any
inefficiencies in some other fashion. And
our suggestion that Congress can address
this issue is no mere hypothesis. The two
branches have repeatedly, and thoroughly,
addressed the problems of vacancies in the
executive branch. Congress has provided for
the temporary filling of a vacancy in a
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particular executive office by an “acting”
officer authorized to perform all of the
duties and exercise all of the powers of that
office, including key national security
positions. Moreover, Congress statutorily
addressed the filling of vacancies in the
executive branch not otherwise provided
for.
Congress has also addressed the problem of
vacancies on various multimember agencies,
providing that members may continue to
serve for some period past the expiration of
their commissions until successors are
nominated and confirmed. …
Admittedly, Congress has chosen not to
provide for acting NLRB members. But that
choice cannot support the Board's
interpretation of the Clause. We cannot
accept an interpretation of the Constitution
completely divorced from its original
meaning in order to resolve exigencies
created by—and equally remediable by—the
executive and legislative branches. …
In any event, if some administrative
inefficiency results from our construction of
the original meaning of the Constitution,
that does not empower us to change what the
Constitution commands. As the Supreme
Court observed in INS v. Chadha, “the fact
that a given law or procedure is efficient,
convenient, and useful in facilitating
functions of government, standing alone,
will not save it if it is contrary to the
Constitution.” It bears emphasis that
“[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the
primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of
democratic government.”

The power of a written constitution lies in its
words. It is those words that were adopted
by the people. When those words speak
clearly, it is not up to us to depart from their
meaning in favor of our own concept of
efficiency, convenience, or facilitation of the
functions of government. In light of the
extensive evidence that the original public
meaning of “happen” was “arise,” we hold
that the President may only make recess
appointments to fill vacancies that arise
during the recess.
Applying this rule to the case before us, we
further hold that the relevant vacancies did
not arise during the intersession recess of the
Senate. The three Board seats that the
President attempted to fill on January 4,
2012, had become vacant on August 27,
2010, August 27, 2011, and January 3, 2012,
respectively. On August 27, 2010, the
Senate was in the midst of an intrasession
recess, so the vacancy that arose on that date
did not arise during “the Recess” for
purposes of the Recess Appointments
Clause. Similarly, the Senate was in an
intrasession recess on August 27, 2011, so
the vacancy that arose on that date also did
not qualify for a recess appointment.
The seat formerly occupied by Member
Becker became vacant at the “End” of the
Senate's session on January 3, 2012—it did
not “happen during the Recess of the
Senate.” First, this vacancy could not have
arisen during an intersession recess because
the Senate did not take an intersession recess
between the first and second sessions of the
112th Congress.
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It has long been the practice of the Senate,
dating back to the First Congress, to
conclude its sessions and enter “the Recess”
with an adjournment sine die. The Senate
has followed this practice even for relatively
brief intersession recesses.
Indeed, various acts of Congress refer to the
adjournment sine die as the conclusion of
the session. …
Because, in this case, the Senate declined to
adjourn sine die on December 30, 2011, it
did not enter an intersession recess, and the
First Session of the 112th Congress expired
simultaneously with the beginning of the
Second Session.
Although the December 17, 2011,
scheduling order specifically provided that
the Second Session of the 112th Congress
would convene on January 3, 2012, it did
not specify when the First Session would
conclude. And, at the last pro forma session
before the January 3, 2012, session, the
Senate adjourned to a date certain: January
3, 2012. Because the Senate did not
adjourn sine die, it did not enter “the
Recess” between the First and Second
Sessions of the 112th Congress. Becker's
appointment therefore expired at the end of
the First Session on January 3, 2012, and the
vacancy in that seat could not have
“happen[ed]” during “the Recess” of the
Senate.
Second, in any event, the Clause states that a
recess appointment expires “at the End of
[the Senate's] next Session,” not “at the
beginning of the Senate's next Recess.”
Likewise, the structure of Article II, Section

2 supports this reading, for “it makes little
sense to allow a second consecutive recess
appointment for the same position, because
the President and the Senate would have had
an entire Senate session during the first
recess appointment to nominate and confirm
a permanent appointee.” The January 3,
2012, vacancy thus did not arise during the
recess, depriving the President of power to
make an appointment under the Recess
Appointments Clause. Because none of the
three appointments were valid, the Board
lacked a quorum and its decision must be
vacated.
Even if the “End” of the session were
“during the Recess,” meaning that the
January 3, 2012, vacancy arose during some
imaginary recess, we hold that the
appointment to that seat is invalid because
the President must make the recess
appointment during the same intersession
recess when the vacancy for that office
arose. The Clause provides that a recess
appointee's commission expires at “the End
of [the Senate's] next Session,” which the
Framers understood as “the end of
the ensuing session.”
Consistent with the structure of the
Appointments Clause and the Recess
Appointments Clause exception to it, the
filling up of a vacancy that happens during a
recess must be done during the same recess
in which the vacancy arose. There is no
reason the Framers would have permitted
the President to wait until some future
intersession recess to make a recess
appointment, for the Senate would have
been sitting in session during the intervening
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period
and
available
nominations….

to

consider

As with the first issue, we hold that
petitioner's
understanding
of
constitutional provision is correct, and
Board's is wrong. The Board had
quorum, and its order is void.
V.
THE
MOTION
INTERVENTION

the
the
the
no

FOR

The Chamber of Commerce and the
Coalition for a Democratic Workplace seek
to intervene. It is the law of this circuit that
litigants seeking to intervene in cases
involving direct review of administrative
actions must establish Article III
standing. Our judicial power is limited to
“Cases” or “Controversies,” meaning that
litigants must show “(1) an injury in fact, (2)
a causal relationship between the injury and
the challenged conduct, and (3) a likelihood
that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision.”
The movants claim to have “associational
standing.” In that context, the Supreme
Court has explained that “an association has
standing to bring suit on behalf of its
members when: (a) its members would
otherwise have standing to sue in their own
right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are
germane to the organization's purpose; and
(c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of
individual members in the lawsuit.”
We need not decide the question of the
movants' standing. Our precedent is clear:
“[I]f one party has standing in an action, a
court need not reach the issue of the

standing of other parties when it makes no
difference to the merits of the case.”
Noel Canning has standing. The case, like
other petitions for review of administrative
adjudications, proceeded between the party
to the administrative adjudication and the
agency. We reached our decision. The
motion is now moot, and we order it
dismissed. The Chamber could have had its
say by filing as an amicus, but for reasons
satisfactory to itself, chose to attempt a
strained claim of intervenor status.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we grant the
petition of Noel Canning and vacate the
Board's order. We deny the cross-petition of
the Board for enforcement of its invalid
order.
So ordered.
GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge, concurring in
the opinion except as to Part IV.B and
concurring in the judgment:
The majority acknowledges that our holding
on intrasession recess appointments is
sufficient to vacate the Board's order, and I
would stop our constitutional analysis there.
If we need not take up a constitutional issue,
we should not. I agree that the Executive's
view that the President can fill vacancies
that “happen to exist” during “the Recess” is
suspect, but that position dates back to at
least the 1820s, making it more venerable
than the much more recent practice of
intrasession recess appointments. We should
not dismiss another branch's longstanding
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interpretation of the Constitution when the
case before us does not demand it.
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“Supreme Court to Weigh in on Obama’s Recess Appointments”
Washington Post
Robert Barnes
June 24, 2013
The Supreme Court announced Monday that
it will decide next term whether President
Obama exceeded his constitutional authority
by making appointments while the Senate
was on break last year.
The case at hand involves Obama’s
appointment of three members of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
but the broader issue concerns the power
that presidents throughout history have used
to fill their administrations in the face of
Senate opposition and inaction.
The justices will review a broad ruling by a
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit that upset
decades of understanding about the
president’s recess appointment power. The
court ruled that presidents may make recess
appointments only between sessions of the
Senate — they generally come at the end of
each year — and not when senators take an
intra-session break.
Recent presidents have made appointments
during both kinds of recesses.
Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr. said
in a petition to the Supreme Court that the
appeals court’s reading of the clause would
“drastically curtail the scope of the
president’s authority.”

In addition, the Supreme Court will consider
a narrower question presented by the
specifics of Obama’s January 2012
appointments: whether the president can
make appointments when the Senate is
holding pro forma sessions designed to
thwart such action.
White House press secretary Jay Carney said
that he was “confident” that the court will
uphold Obama’s appointments and that “the
issue here is about the president having the
authority that all of his predecessors have
had to make these recess appointments.”
Thomas J. Donohue, president of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, welcomed the
court’s decision to hear the case. “We
warned last year that by appointing these
members to the NLRB in such a
controversial fashion, a cloud of uncertainty
covered the agency and its work,” he said.
Obama has used the recess appointments
power fairly modestly compared with recent
predecessors. But he went where no other
president had gone in his appointment of the
three NLRB members and his appointment
of Richard Cordray to head the fledgling
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
Senators had gone home, but the Senate was
holding pro forma sessions by convening
with one senator every three days.
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The White House justified appointing the
NLRB members by reasoning that the
Senate actually was in recess because it was
not available to fulfill its advice-and-consent
role by conducting business.
A challenge brought by a Pepsi bottler in the
state of Washington and backed by the U.S.
Chamber went to the D.C. Circuit. But in
January, the unanimous panel skipped past
the question of pro forma sessions for a far
broader ruling.

D.C. Circuit Judge David B. Sentelle wrote
that the administration’s interpretation of
when recess appointments may be made
would give the president “free rein to
appoint his desired nominees at any time he
pleases, whether that time be a weekend,
lunch, or even when the Senate is in session
and he is merely displeased with its
inaction.”
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“U.S.: Limit Appointment Power Review”
SCOTUS Blog
Lyle Denniston
June 7, 2013
The Obama administration has urged the
Supreme Court to limit its review of the
President’s
constitutional
power
to
temporarily fill vacancies in government
offices, saying that the Justices should not
take on an added question not yet ruled on
by any lower court. Even so, it conceded
that it is up to the Court to choose the scope
of its review.
The new argument on how far the Court
should go came late Thursday as
administration lawyers filed their reply
brief in National Labor Relations Board v.
Noel Canning (docket 12-1281). The
Justices are scheduled to consider at their
June 20 Conference whether they will hear
the case at all, and what issues they would
address if the case is set for review next
Term.
When the administration first took the case
to the Supreme Court in April, it asked the
Justices to rule on the two issues on which
appointments to the NLRB had failed in the
D.C. Circuit: whether the President may
make temporary appointments to vacant
posts only at the end of the Senate’s annual
sessions or also during other breaks in
sessions, and whether the President could
fill a post that became open at any time
during an annual session or only those that
became vacant in the end-of-session periods.
Noel Canning, a soft drink bottling company
in Yakima, Washington, notified the Court

last month that it did not oppose Supreme
Court review of those issues, but it asked the
Court to tack on a third question: may the
President ever make a recess appointment
when the Senate is returning to meet every
three days, even if it does little or no
business in such a sitting?
That question is essential, the company’s
attorneys argued, because it is the one
question that would settle whether the
specific appointments made by President
Obama to the NLRB were constitutional;
those were made when the Senate was
holding “pro forma” sessions — with maybe
only a single senator in the chamber and
little or nothing was getting done. Such
recurring formal gatherings should never
amount to a recess that creates an
opportunity for the President to make an
appointment, Noel Canning contended.
While this case was being reviewed by the
D.C. Circuit, both sides had taken positions
on whether such sessions eliminated the
existence of any recess, but, in the end, the
Circuit Court did not role on that. U.S.
Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., in
the NLRB’s new reply brief, pointed out that
fact.
“That question,” the brief said, “was not
resolved by the court of appeals, and it has
not yet been resolved by any court.” It
might possibly come up in other cases now
pending in lower courts, Verrilli conceded,
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but has not yet been discussed in a final
ruling at that level.
It has long been the Court’s practice, the
brief noted, that it does not allow itself to be
the first to pass upon a constitutional
matter. If the Court did seek in this case to
define whether pro forma sessions defeat the
existence of a recess, the brief went on, that
would only prolong the threat to presidential
appointment powers that already existed
under the Circuit Court ruling. That would
not eliminate the dispute among courts of
appeals on the issues that the government
seeks to have reviewed, the document
added.

actually arise if a lower court were to rule on
it in one of the other pending cases, before
the Supreme Court could get to the Noel
Canning case next Term.
If the Court were inclined “to use this case
to decide what effect pro-forma sessions of
the Senate have on the existence of a
recess,” Verrilli wrote, it should add that
question at the time it granted review of the
government’s petition. That would put
everyone on notice that they should address
that issue, too, in the written briefing. If it
does so, lawyers should be given added
space in their merits briefs to discuss that
and the issues the Solicitor General has
raised, the brief commented.

The Solicitor General, however, went on to
suggest that this additional issue might
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“Court Ruling Upsets Conventional Wisdom on Recess Appointments”
NPR
Carrie Johnson
January 25, 2013
In a bombshell decision on the limits of
executive power, a federal appeals court
panel in Washington, D.C., has invalidated
President Obama's recess appointments to
the National Labor Relations Board.

"The first," Francisco said, "is when is the
recess appointment power triggered in the
first place? And there what the court said
was that it only is triggered during
intersession recesses."

Legal experts say the court's reasoning
upends decades of conventional wisdom and
deals a big victory to Senate Republicans in
an era of congressional gridlock.

By that, he means recesses between sessions
of Congress — not those short breaks so
common these days.

The case was brought by a Pepsi-Cola
bottling company in a fight with a union.
The company, Noel Canning, sued to
challenge a decision by the Labor Relations
Board, arguing that three board members
were appointed in violation of the U.S.
Constitution.
Without those three members — who
arrived in January 2012 after Obama
bypassed the Senate — the board would
have no quorum and would essentially be
out of business.
"We have a system of rules in this country
that confine executive power, and the courts
stand ready to enforce those lines when
they're crossed," said Noel Francisco, a
lawyer at the Jones Day firm who argued the
case for the company and the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce.
The judges on the appeals court panel — all
named by Republican presidents —
answered two big questions.

The court added that the Senate, not the
president, got to decide what it meant by a
recess.
"Allowing the President to define the scope
of his own appointments power would
eviscerate the Constitution's separation of
powers," wrote Judge David Sentelle for the
court majority. "An interpretation of 'the
Recess' that permits the President to decide
when the Senate is in recess would demolish
the checks and balances inherent in the
advice-and-consent requirement, giving the
President free rein to appoint his desired
nominees at any time he pleases, whether
that time be a weekend, lunch, or even when
the Senate is in session and he is merely
displeased with its inaction. This cannot be
the law."
Senate Republicans raced to embrace the
decision, which came only a day after
lawmakers reached a compromise on the use
of the filibuster. Senate Minority Leader
Mitch McConnell of Kentucky intervened in
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the lawsuit along with more than 40 other
senators.
Sen. Mike Lee of Utah, who refused to vote
for any other Obama nominees after the
recess appointments last year, called it a
"vindication of the principled stand I have
taken."
The court's next holding went even further,
lawyer Francisco said, to cover "what types
of vacancies are eligible for recess
appointments in the first place."
Two judges on the panel, Sentelle and Karen
LeCraft Henderson, said under their reading
of the Constitution, the vacancy had to
actually arise during the recess, or else no
dice.
The third judge, Thomas Griffith, said the
court didn't need to go that far. He pointed
out that until Friday's ruling, the
understanding about the kinds of vacancies
open to recess appointments dated all the
way back to the 1820s.
"We should not dismiss another branch's
longstanding
interpretation
of
the
Constitution when the case before us does
not demand it," Griffith said.
John Elwood, a Washington lawyer who has
studied the recess appointment power for
years, called this "a very, very broad ruling
that, if it stands, will significantly diminish
the president's recess appointment power."
Elwood, now at the Vinson & Elkins law
firm, said the decision unsettles decades of
conventional wisdom about the practice,
which has been used by both Republican

and Democratic presidents at least 280 times
to get around Senate gridlock and appoint
agency heads and other executive branch
officials.
The ruling also puts a legal cloud over more
than 100 actions the Labor Relations Board
has taken since last year. But legal experts
say each company involved would have to
file its own lawsuit to throw out those
actions, which could take some time.
The uncertainty extends to the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, whose leader,
Richard Cordray, was appointed on the same
day as the NLRB members.
Sam Kazman, a lawyer who represents a
plaintiff in a lawsuit challenging the
constitutionality of the Dodd-Frank financial
overhaul and the creation of the financial
protection bureau, said, "We're confident
that Mr. Cordray's appointment will meet
the same fate as those NLRB members.
They will be remembered as the Not-So-Fab
Four of the Appointments Clause."
White House spokesman Jay Carney said the
president
"strongly
but
respectfully
disagrees with the ruling."
"It basically calls into question 150 years of
precedent," Carney told reporters Friday
afternoon.
The Justice Department had no immediate
word on an appeal. But Lynn Rhinehart, the
general counsel at the AFL-CIO, had this to
say: "This is one decision that we think is so
far out there that we really expect to see it
reversed."

327

The decision conflicts with a holding by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit in
Atlanta, and lawyers for both sides expect

the case to wind up in the U.S. Supreme
Court.
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“Employers Embrace Noel Canning on NLRB Recess Appointments”
Daily Report
Frederick L. Warren
April 16, 2013
In Noel Canning v. NLRB, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that
President Obama's three January 2012 recess
appointments to the National Labor
Relations Board were invalid, resulting in an
absence of a quorum for the NLRB to
conduct business. The case, arising in a
period of heightened political and legal
battles concerning the NLRB, elevated a
labor dispute to a constitutional issue headed
for the U.S. Supreme Court with potentially
far-reaching repercussions.
Putting the more than 600 decisions issued
by the board since the January 2012 recess
appointments subject to question, Noel
Canning has already had substantial effects.
Employers are filing petitions for review of
board decisions in the D.C. Circuit, which
has held board cases before it in abeyance
pending further order of the court.
Employers have also raised the Noel
Canning defense as challenges to decisions
of the board in other circuit courts.
Employers have argued that Noel Canning's
rationale applies to Craig Becker's recess
appointment, which expired in January
2012. If his appointment were invalid, that
means board decisions were made without a
quorum back to August 2011, when the term
of Wilma Liebman expired, and also are in
question.
To put Noel Canning in context, it helps to
understand the controversy concerning the

NLRB, the regulatory agency administering
the National Labor Relations Act. It has five
board members, serving terms of five years,
who are nominated by the president subject
to confirmation by the Senate. The board
protects employees' rights to organize and
acts to prevent and remedy unfair labor
practices. Additionally, the board acts as a
quasi-judicial body in deciding cases on the
basis of records in administrative
proceedings.
Board decisions are not self-enforcing. The
NLRA allows the board to petition a federal
court of appeals for enforcement. A party
aggrieved by a final board order may
petition for review in applicable circuit
courts, including the D.C. Circuit.
Largely for political reasons, the Senate has
not voted on some nominations made by
both Democratic and Republican presidents.
Consequently, the board regularly has
operated with fewer than five members.
Presidents have made recess appointments
when the Senate has failed to act on
nominations.
In 2010's New Process Steel v. NLRB, the
Supreme Court ruled that the NLRB must
have a quorum of at least three members to
conduct business. The board had operated
from January 2008 to March 2010 with only
two members due to the Senate's failure to
confirm nominees. During that time,
approximately 550 cases were decided by
329

the board, but ultimately only about 100
two-member decisions were returned to the
board for new decisions to be issued.
There is a widespread perception in the
business community that Obama's board has
been particularly pro-labor in its actions and
decisions. One of his recess appointments
was Becker, whose appointment expired on
Jan. 3, 2012, which would have resulted in
the board being reduced to two members
again. But on Jan. 4, 2012, Obama made
three recess appointments to the board:
Sharon Block to fill Becker's seat, Terence
Flynn to fill a seat that became vacant in
August 2010 and Richard Griffin to fill a
seat that became vacant in August 2011. At
the same time, Obama made a recess
appointment of Richard Cordray as the first
director of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau.
In a political maneuver to prevent Obama
from making recess appointments after
Congress started a holiday break in
December 2011, the Senate held pro forma
sessions every three business days through
Jan. 23, 2012. During the Senate's Jan. 3 pro
forma session, the Senate acted to convene
the second session of the 112th Congress.
The
facts
in Noel
Canning are
straightforward. Teamsters Local 760, which
represents workers at the Yakima, Wash.,
plant owned by Noel Canning Corp., a
bottler and distributor of Pepsi products,
filed an unfair labor practice charge with the
NLRB. The board issued a decision on Feb.
8, 2012, finding that the company had
unlawfully refused to execute a written
collective-bargaining
agreement

incorporating the terms agreed upon during
negotiations. The company filed a petition
for review in the D.C. Circuit. The court
found that substantial evidence supported
the board's conclusion that an agreement
was reached and the company unlawfully
refused to execute it.
However, Noel Canning's constitutional
challenge set the stage for the NLRB's
upheaval. The company raised an argument
that the board lacked authority to issue a
decision for want of a quorum, as three
members were not validly appointed
because the recess appointments were made
when the Senate was not in recess. The
company also argued that the vacancies
these three members filled did not become
vacant, or "happen during the Recess of the
Senate," as required by the recessappointments clause of the Constitution.
As a threshold matter, the court questioned
whether it had jurisdiction because the
company had made no attempt to raise the
issues related to the recess appointments
before the board. The section of the NLRA
governing judicial review of board decisions
says: "No objection that has not been urged
before the Board … shall be considered by
the court, unless the failure or neglect to
urge such objection shall be excused
because of extraordinary circumstances."
The court held that the company's failure to
raise the objection before the board fell
within the exception because a constitutional
challenge to the board's composition was an
extraordinary circumstance.
The recess-appointments clause provides
that "[t]he President shall have Power to fill
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up all Vacancies that may happen during the
Recess of the Senate, by granting
Commissions which shall expire at the End
of their next Session." The company argued
that the term "the Recess" refers only to the
intersession recess of the Senate, which is
the period between sessions of the Senate.
The board countered that the recess
appointment procedure is available during
intrasession recesses or breaks in the
Senate's business when it is otherwise in
session.
The court agreed with the company that the
term "the Recess" refers only to the
intersession recess of the Senate and not to
adjournments during a session. The court
also said that the history and interpretation
of the clause at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution and the years immediately
following the Constitution's ratification
supported its conclusion.
Second, the court held that the meaning of
the word "happen" in the clause requires that
the vacancy actually arises or occurs during
the recess between sessions. The court
rejected the board's arguments that "happen"
means happens to exist during the recess,
regardless of when the vacancy began.
In reaching its decision, the D.C. Circuit
considered and rejected an earlier decision
of the Eleventh Circuit reaching opposite
conclusions. In Evans v. Stephens, the
Eleventh Circuit ruled on constitutional
challenges to the recess appointment of
William Pryor to that court by President
Bush in February 2004 while the Senate
took a break in its session.

In Evans, the Eleventh Circuit started its
analysis by saying that when a president is
acting under color of express authority of
the Constitution, the court starts with a
presumption that his acts are constitutional.
The presumption is rebuttable. However, the
challengers must overcome it and persuade
the court to the contrary. Simply showing
that there are plausible interpretations of the
Constitution different from the president's is
not enough.
Looking at the language of the Constitution,
the nation's history, and the purpose of the
recess-appointments
clause—to
keep
important offices filled and government
functioning when the Senate is not in
session—the court ruled that "recess" in the
clause can refer to intrasession as well as
intersession recesses of the Senate.
Similarly, the court concluded that "happen"
is open to more than one interpretation. It
could mean happen to be or exists. The court
found that to be the more acceptable
interpretation. Two other circuit courts
similarly have interpreted "happen" to mean
"exists" rather than "arises": U.S. v.
Woodley (9th Cir. 1985) and U.S. v.
Allocco (2d Cir. 1962).
Board Chairman Mark Pearce announced
after the Noel Canning ruling that the board
disagreed with it and would continue
business as usual. In February, Obama
renominated Sharon Block and Richard
Griffin to the board. The board comprises
Block, Griffin and Pearce, whose term
expires in August. Last week, Obama
renominated Pearce to another term and
nominated Harry Johnson III and Philip
Miscimarra to round out the board.
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The NLRB decided not to seek en banc
rehearing by the D.C. Circuit in Noel
Canning and has announced that it intends
to file a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court. The petition for certiorari is
due April 25. If the Supreme Court accepts
the case, it may not agree with the D.C.
Circuit's conclusion that the extraordinarycircumstances exception applies, which
would allow the court to reach the
constitutional issues not raised with the
board. It is also unclear whether the court
would adopt the Eleventh Circuit's
presumption of constitutionality regarding
the president's actions.
A challenge to Richard Cordray's recess
appointment to the Consumer Financial

Protection Bureau,State National Bank of
Big Spring v. Jacob J. Lew, is pending in the
U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, where Noel Canning is binding.
A Supreme Court decision could affect the
balance of power between the president and
the
Senate
regarding
presidential
appointments and, at least from a historical
perspective, the composition of the court
itself. Almost a dozen justices were initially
placed on the court through recess
appointments, including Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr., Earl Warren, William Brennan
and Potter Stewart. The last president to
make such recess appointments was Dwight
Eisenhower.
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“A Judicial Atrocity”
The New Yorker
Jeffrey Toobin
January 29, 2013
Right-wing judicial activism has been
ascendant in recent years. Five years ago, in
the case of District of Columbia v. Heller,
the Supreme Court, rewrote decades of
Second Amendment jurisprudence to thwart
local legislators who passed gun control
laws. Three years ago, in Citizens United, a
majority of the Justices overturned decades
of precedent to deregulate modern campaign
financing. But even these decisions, and
others like them, pale beside last week’s
extravagant act of judicial hubris by the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit. There, in Canning v. National Labor
Relations
Board,
three
federal
judges revealed themselves as Republican
National Committeemen in robes.

controversy about whether they should
exercise this power, but no legal challenge
to their right to do so.

The facts of the case were straightforward.
The N.L.R.B. is supposed to have five
members, and it cannot act without a
quorum of three. After Republicans in the
Senate obstructed the nominations of
President Obama’s three nominees to the
board (a fact not mentioned, revealingly
enough, in the opinion), the President made
so-called recess appointments to fill the
vacancies.

The D.C. Circuit nevertheless found that
Obama’s appointment of the three N.L.R.B.
members was invalid. According to the
court’s tortured reasoning, the Senate was
not really “in recess” when the three were
named. Indeed, the opinion essentially said
that the Senate need almost never be in
recess; a handful of senators could create
“pro-forma” sessions that would trump any
President’s ability to make appointments.
Even beyond that, the opinion more or less
removed the President’s ability to use recess
appointments in all but a small handful of
cases, suggesting that the vacancies would
have to occur, not just remain unfilled,
during recesses. The appointments of not
only the N.L.R.B. commissioners but also of

Recess appointments, which are specifically
authorized in the Constitution, have been
facts of political life for decades. When
faced with senators’ refusals to act on
nominations Presidents simply made
appointments while the Senate was not in
session. There was some political

As the Times reported (but the D.C. Circuit,
once again, did not see fit to mention),
President Bill Clinton made a hundred and
thirty-nine recess appointments, while
George W. Bush made a hundred and
seventy-one, including those of John R.
Bolton as Ambassador to the United Nations
and two appeals-court judges, William H.
Pryor, Jr., and Charles W. Pickering, Sr.,
Obama has made only thirty-two such
appointments, including that of Richard
Cordray as director of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau.
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Cordray, and all of the actions of his new
organization, are now in clear jeopardy.
So, who cares? Why does this dispute about
an obscure constitutional provision matter?
And who benefits from the court’s decision?
The decision matters because it is a huge gift
to the contemporary Republican Party—
especially to Republican senators. Senate
Republicans
have
engaged
in
an
unprecedented level of obstruction of
President
Obama’s
nominations—to
executive-branch positions, to independent
agencies, and especially to federal
judgeships. Recess appointments have given
Obama a small degree of leverage to fight
back. Characteristically, he hasn’t used this
power much, especially compared with his
predecessors; Obama has tried to negotiate
his way out of the problem, with little to
show for it. But the D.C. Circuit decision, if
it stands, essentially gives veto power to
Senate Republicans. If they simply refuse to
act on Obama’s appointments, he is now
powerless to respond. The opinion also said
that any action taken by improper recess
appointees would be invalid. So the opinion
could paralyze a major chunk of the federal
government. Filibusters by senators who
don’t approve of the United Nations could
prevent us from having any ambassador at
all; indeed, these senators could theoretically
leave a President without any Cabinet
members at all.
Who wrote this judicial atrocity? No
surprise—it was David Sentelle, who has a
long and disgraceful reputation as a partisan
hack on the bench. A protégé of Jesse
Helms, his fellow North Carolinian, Sentelle

is most famous for engineering, in 1994, the
dismissal of Robert Fiske as the Whitewater
Independent Counsel and replacing him with
Kenneth Starr. (How’d that work out?) As a
judge, Sentelle has been a thoroughgoing
reactionary for thirty years. He was joined in
his opinion by two fellow Republican
appointees to the D.C. Circuit.
Where, one might ask, were President
Obama’s appointees to the D.C. Circuit,
often described as the second most
important court in the country? After fourplus years as President, Obama has
succeeded in placing exactly zero judges on
this court. The reasons for this absence
reflect the strange record of this President on
judicial appointments. To some extent,
Obama has simply been asleep at this
particular switch, nominating judges late or
not at all. Obama did nothing while D.C.
Circuit vacancies lingered, before finally
nominating Caitlin Halligan, a widely
respected New York prosecutor. Halligan, in
turn, was shamefully filibustered by the
Republicans in the Senate, like so many
other Obama appointees. Obama has
resubmitted Halligan, along with another
excellent nominee, Sri Srinivasan, to the
Senate—where they languish. Thanks to
Sentelle’s decision to take senior status,
there are now four vacancies on the D.C.
Circuit. Obama’s lassitude plus the
Republicans’ obstruction equals decisions
like this one on recess appointments.
The Obama Administration will surely
challenge the Sentelle ruling—either before
the full court of appeals or in the Supreme
Court. Like the health-care decision, this one
is so terrible that it might stir even some
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Republican judges to overturn it. Some day,
of course, there will be a Republican
President, and this decision will give Senate
Democrats the chance to cripple him or her,
too. John G. Roberts, Jr., and Samuel A.
Alito, Jr., both started in government during
the Reagan Administration; they have a real
appreciation for executive power, and they
may resist giving the Senate unlimited
power to make mischief. Or they, like
Sentelle, may simply want to cripple a

Democratic President now and worry about
Republican Presidents when the time comes.
In any event, the D.C. Circuit’s decision is a
useful reminder of where power resides in
Washington. Presidents come and go, but
the judges are there forever. And they know
it.
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“Passport Law on Jerusalem Unconstitutional, Federal Appeals Court Says”
Fox News
July 23, 2013
A federal appeals court Tuesday declared
unconstitutional a law allowing Americans
born in Jerusalem to list Israel as their
birthplace on their U.S. passports, the latest
ruling in a case that stretches back a decade.
The three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
said that the 2002 law impermissibly
infringes on the president's exercise of the
power to recognize foreign governments.
The case was brought by parents of an
American
boy
named
Menachem
Zivotofsky, who was born in a Jerusalem
hospital soon after the law was passed. The
parents wanted to list Israel as his birthplace,
but the U.S. has refused to recognize any
nation's sovereignty over Jerusalem since
Israel's creation in 1948 -- so the boy's U.S.
passport only says "Jerusalem" as his
birthplace.
The Bush administration said Congress may
not tell the president what to do regarding
this aspect of foreign relations, and the
Obama administration has taken the same
position. Longstanding U.S. foreign policy
that says the status of Jerusalem should be
resolved in negotiations between Israel and
the Palestinians.
Tuesday's opinion, written by Judge Karen
LeCraft Henderson, an appointee of
President George H.W. Bush, took a long

look at the history of the president's power
to recognize other countries.
"Beginning with the administration of our
first president, George Washington, the
executive has believed that it has the
exclusive power to recognize foreign
nations," she wrote.
Henderson included several examples of
presidents asserting authority over Congress
in this area, including the Senate
consideration of a 1919 resolution
recommending withdrawing recognition of
the
Mexican
government.
President
Woodrow Wilson wrote a letter to Congress
that if the resolution were to pass, it would
"constitute a reversal of our constitutional
practice which might lead to very grave
confusion in regard to the guidance of our
foreign affairs" because "the initiative in
directing the relations of our government
with foreign governments is assigned by the
Constitution to the executive, and to the
executive, only." The chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee quickly
declared the resolution "dead."
In addition, Henderson wrote, the Supreme
Court has more than once said that the
recognition power lies exclusively with the
president.
She said the passport law "runs headlong
into a carefully calibrated and longstanding
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executive branch policy of neutrality toward
Jerusalem."
The law was part of a large foreign affairs
bill that President George W. Bush signed
into law. But even as he did so, Bush issued
a signing statement in which he said that
"U.S. policy regarding Jerusalem has not
changed."
Henderson said that the purpose of the
passport law was to alter U.S. foreign policy
toward Jerusalem, noting its title is "United
States Policy with Respect to Jerusalem as
the Capital of Israel."
Henderson was joined by Judge Judith W.
Rogers, an appointee of President Bill
Clinton. The third judge, David S. Tatel,
also a Clinton appointee, filed a concurring
opinion in which he said he fully concurred
in the court's opinion, but wanted to
"elucidate my thinking about the important
and novel separation-of-powers question this
case presents."

The attorney for the Zivotofskys, Nathan
Lewin, said in a statement that he'll try to
get the case heard in the U.S. Supreme
Court.
"We hope that before Menachem
Zivotofsky's bar mitzvah he will be able to
bear a passport that recognizes his birthplace
as `Israel,"' Lewin wrote. Jewish boys have
their bar mitzvah at the age of 13.
The lawsuit was filed back in 2003, and a
judge said it was a political question for
Congress and the president to work out
without the intervention of the courts. A
three-judge appeals court panel -- made up
of different judges than the panel which
decided the case Tuesday -- agreed that it
had no authority to consider the claim.
But the Supreme Court last year overturned
the ruling and sent the case back down to the
appeals court to decide whether the law was
constitutional.
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“Will ‘Israel’ Passport Case Return to the Supreme Court?”
Washington Jewish Week
July 25, 2013
An attorney for Washington-area residents
Ari and Naomi Zivotofsky says he plans to
file a petition to the Supreme Court within
90 days, after a federal appeals court this
week upheld the State Department’s refusal
to list “Israel” as the country of birth for
their Jerusalem-born son, Menachem, 11.
Congress in 2002 passed a law mandating
the listing of “Israel” should Americans born
in Jerusalem request it. But the State
Department has not complied, arguing the
law impinges on the executive branch’s
foreign policy prerogative.
The Supreme Court last year had remanded
the case of Zivotofsky v. the Secretary of
State to the court of appeals to decide
whether the president must follow the
congressional directive.
On July 23, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia ruled that to list Israel
“runs headlong into a carefully calibrated
and longstanding executive branch policy of
neutrality toward Jerusalem.”
Now, Zivotofsky attorney Nathan Lewin
wants to return the case to the Supreme
Court. “I think they would agree to hear the
case again and decide it,” he told WJW.
The next step after he files the petition is the
government’s response. “The case probably
won’t be heard until January or February
2014,” he said.

Jewish groups, some of whom had filed
friend of the court briefs on behalf of the
Zivotofskys, were largely critical of the
ruling.
Conference of Presidents of Major
American Jewish Organizations Chairman
Robert Sugarman and Executive Vice
Chairman Malcolm Hoenlein called the
decision “disappointing” and expressed the
“hope [that] the administration will
reconsider the issue… . We hope that the
Supreme Court will reverse this policy that
discriminates singularly against Israel, and
will afford those born in Jerusalem the same
right accorded to those born elsewhere.”
U.S. Rep. Eliot Engel (D-N.Y.) said the
ruling “not only flies in the face of basic
geography, but thumbs its nose at the fact
that the U.S. Constitution clearly places
authority over passports and regulations
regarding U.S. citizens born abroad in the
hands of Congress.”
And
the
ADL
expressed
“deep
disappointment” in the decision. It had
earlier “argued that the purpose of passports
is for identification, and that the issuance of
them does not establish or implement
foreign policy.”
“Even Taiwan-born U.S. citizens are
permitted to identify Taiwan as their
birthplace, despite protests by China, the
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recognized sovereign over that territory,”
said Abraham H. Foxman, ADL’s national
director.
Nathan Diament, executive director of
public policy for the Orthodox Union, said
the fact that Jerusalem is Israel’s political
capital “has been recognized again and again
by the United States Congress and duly
enacted laws, even as such recognition has
been practically unrecognized by the

Executive Branch… . The practice of the
State Department to refuse compliance with
the law is wrong and we will support the
appeal of this ruling to the U.S. Supreme
Court.”
Marc Stern, the American Jewish
Committee’s general counsel, said, “An
American passport, not the current and
future status of Jerusalem, is the core issue
in the Zivotofsky case.”
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“The Jerusalem Passport Case – Separation of Powers and Standing”
The Volokh Conspiracy
Eugene Kontorovich
July 23, 2013
The D.C. Circuit has held the Jerusalem
passport
law
unconstitutional
for
impermissibly intruding into the Executive’s
foreign relations powers. The law requiring
the State Department to record “Israel” as
the country of birth for those born in
Jerusalem. The D.C. Circuit, through
extensive and lucid analysis, concluded that
recognition was an exclusively executive
function, on which the Act impinges. The
lawsuit, brought by Menachem Zivotofsky,
an American born in Jerusalem, has gone on
for a decade, but this will probably be the
end.
The D.C. Circuit’s separation of powers
analysis was quite strong, though I think the
case lacks standing, as Judge Gladys Kessler
on the district court first ruled nine years
ago.
The plaintiff, claimed the issue was just
about passports, and did not involve
recognizing foreign countries. The argument
was hard to take seriously: refusing to
recognize Israeli sovereignty over Western
Jerusalem, on passports or elsewhere, is a
crucial limitation on the U.S.’s recognition
of the State of Israel.
More interesting was the plaintiff’s
argument that Congress itself acted through
an enumerated power – Immigration and
Naturalization.
The
Court
rather
convincingly showed that passports were not

central to this power, which in any case was
concurrent with the Executive’s foreign
policy powers. Thus in rock-paper-scissors
terms, an exclusive executive power
(recognition) beats a concurrent legislative
one.
One might think that the Immigration power
naturally overlaps with recognition:
immigration requires a prior determination
of foreignness. The Executive has never
taken a position one way or another the
sovereignty over Jerusalem. Heck, it might
be part of New York, in which case no
immigration or naturalization would be
needed. Indeed, because of the particular
circumstances here – Congress is not
contesting a determination of Jerusalem’s
status, but rather a non-determination – one
might think Congress cannot exercise its
powers without such a determination. More
broadly, immigration laws may allow
different numbers of people to come from
different countries, thus it would be essential
to determine what country Jerusalem is in.
Two years ago, the Supreme Court, in
M.B.Z. v. Clinton, rejected the D.C. Circuit’s
dismissal of the case on political question
grounds. I would have instead dismissed for
lack of standing, as the district court
originally did (before being reversed by the
Court of Appeals; the district court then
dismissed as a political question, which the
Supreme Court ultimately reversed). The
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plaintiff has no injury. His passport is
property of the State Department, he has no
proprietary interest in its contents.
Rather, the passport is merely a vehicle to
challenge a broader government policy. The
D.C. Circuit, in reversing the standing
dismissal, concluded that the law created an
new, individual right to have “Israel” written
in one’s passport. Such a legal right would
satisfy standing, but there is little evidence
that Congress created such a right. The
statute instructs the State Department to
“upon the request of the citizen or the
citizen’s legal guardian, record the place of
birth as Israel”. This seems simply to specify
the procedure by which “Israel” would be
placed on the passport, rather than create a
individual right. It is certainly less obviously

a cause of action than procedural rights
created under various administrative laws,
where the Court has upheld standing (as in
FEC v. Akins). Those at least specifically
authorize lawsuits and speak of “aggrieved
parties.” The provision in question looks
more like an order to the administration,
rather than the establishment of an
individual right.
Indeed, I suppose the reason for the “upon
the request” language was not to require
those born in Jerusalem who might not want
it described at “Israel” to be forced to bear
such a description in their passports; that
would also generate additional hostility and
opposition to the rule. If anything, this is an
individual right to NOT have “Israel”
printed in one’s passport.
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